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Preface 
Looking away from the computer screen and beyond the heaps of books 
and papers more or less relevant for my work, I see my bicycle’s spiked 
winter tires, the third season of the TV series ‘The Wire’ as well as the 
second season of ‘Twin Peaks’ (part one), a squash racket, a souvenir 
from Syria, somebody’s future Christmas gift, an old towel, ski cleansing 
spray, two cheap deodorant sticks, nine pair of shoes and quite a few 
other elements with no obvious purpose in an office environment. I can’t 
really explain how and why the majority of my footwear ended up in my 
office, but I guess this accumulation of shoes and other stuff could be 
interpreted that it is time to come to an end with this project and transfer a 
considerably larger share of my belongings and time to the domestic 
arena.  
Although writing a PhD thesis sometimes feels like a lonely endeavor, 
many have in some way or other contributed to make my job easier, 
better or funnier. First, I’d like to thank my two supervisors Professor 
Merete Lie at the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies of Culture 
(NTNU) and Professor Knut Bjørn Lindkvist at the Department of 
Geography (University of Bergen). You have challenged my 
stubbornness and more or less clever ideas with valuable and constructive 
comments which have contributed to make this product and process better. 
I want to thank Dolly Jørgensen who has made a great effort removing 
some of the Norwegian accent in my writing. I’d also like to express my 
gratitude to all colleagues at the Department of Interdisciplinary Cultural 
Studies. Although – or perhaps because – most of you work with quite 
different questions and approaches than I’ve done, working here has been 
interesting, enlightening and enjoyable. Especially, I’d like to say hello 
and thanks to the “basse team”1 for the 2-300 matches we’ve played 
during work hours over the last couple of years. I’m sure that the energy 
we won made up for the time we lost! 
Since this dissertation is a collection of articles it means that I’ve received 
quite a lot of input from a number of anonymous reviewers. Their reports 
have been constructive and in most cases encouraging! Thanks to all of 
you – whether you concluded yes or no in your recommendation to the 
respective editor! 
                                                 
1 ‘Basse’ is a local game played with a “ball” made by a bicycle inner tube (see 
www.basse.no).  
  四
As part of this work I’ve also had a few stays in China where I’ve met, 
traveled, discussed, argued, cooperated, played tennis, dined and wined 
and studied with a lot of people. Thanks to all of you! You’ve contributed 
to confirm my conviction that fieldwork is the best part of any research 
project. In particular, I’d like to send my regards to my fieldwork partners 
Zhou Gang, Gu Yan and Zhou Xiaolan who accompanied me in research 
on “the far side of international business”.  
This thesis is quite slim as it is, but without informants it would be 
downright meager. Thanks to all of you who at some point or another 
agreed to meet me to discuss your business and opinions, even though it 
probably didn't seem very clear to you how this information would be 
used. Especially the Norwegian lifeboat company Le Bang2 and its plant 
manager deserves tanks for hospitality, interest and information! 
Then, the star of any thank you speech/section: my mother! Thanks for 
good and long-lasting support and for all the berries and mushrooms. I 
promise to find time for some berry-picking next year! 
Finally, Siri and my favorite work obstruction Eldar – we need to make 
space for nine pair of shoes and a few other belongings you haven’t seen 
in a while. Thanks for your endurance and for giving me the flexibility to 
come through with this project! We had a great stay in Shanghai; I hope 
we can go back some day! 
Trondheim, September 8, 2008 
                                                 
2 Real company, fictitious name. 
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1 
From salmon to lifeboats: Introducing the far side of 
international business 
 
 
Introduction 
My first project in China, which resulted in the master thesis “Lykkefisk 
& Love Kitchen”1 (Hansen, 2002), was a slightly critical examination of 
Norwegian strategies to establish salmon as an ingredient in Chinese 
cuisine. An outcome of this study was that I realized that the Norwegians 
learned and adapted to the Chinese market and business structure, but the 
local actors were learning and adapting to a new situation as well. 
“Perfect” adaptation to Chinese business and consumer preferences, 
structure and behavior was consequently not a goal that Norwegian 
salmon exporters could pursue and finally achieve – the preferences, 
structure and behavior of Chinese consumers and businesses were (and 
still are) dynamic and both influenced by as well as able to influence 
international companies entering China. This may not sound like a 
groundbreaking discovery, but at the time (and, for that matter, still) 
theories and empirical work dealing with internationalization were 
preoccupied with the learning and adaptation processes of international 
companies, largely overlooking local response to international initiatives 
and how the dynamics between international and local actors together 
contribute to create a new situation which alters the business environment. 
True enough, many have emphasized the impact of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) on local actors, but these studies tend to portray the 
locals (be it consumers, workers, companies or governments) as merely 
recipients of impulses from the global economy, depicted as MNCs or 
some kind of vague force.  
My conclusion after Lykkefisk & Love Kitchen was that there was still 
work to be done. In my approach to the PhD project the fundamental 
                                                 
1 English translation: Fortune Fish & Love Kitchen 
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assumption is that both internationals and locals are empowered with the 
ability to evaluate and act on the situation in which they find themselves 
and that evaluations and actions on both sides intersect and shape the 
reality in which both sides operate. In order to capture the dynamics 
between entrants and locals it is of vital importance to study the 
encounters between them from various angles and by questioning actors 
on both sides of the local-international divide. The starting point of this 
project is not salmon exports, but a Norwegian lifeboat producer that 
entered China by acquisition in 2004. This dissertation is to a certain 
extent the story about how this company adapted to China, but even more, 
it is a story about how their new Chinese competitors, suppliers and 
customers adapted to them; how the presence of Norwegian lifeboat 
producers have contributed to the development of the Chinese lifeboat 
industry and, further, how Chinese development in this industry now is 
affecting Norwegian activities in the same industry – in other words, the 
internationalization and domestication of Norwegian lifeboats in China. 
The first section of this introduction provides a brief summary of the four 
articles included in the dissertation. The second section which is titled 
‘Opening the black box of international business’ addresses international 
business studies lack of interest in host country actors, dynamics and 
linkages between internationals and locals. The section continues by 
applying the concept ‘domestication’, borrowed from Science and 
Technology Studies, to support the need for a perspective which 
contributes to dismantle the dichotomy between active internationals and 
passive locals. The third section ‘From imitation to innovation: China’s 
economic miracle from a lifeboat perspective’ discusses theories on 
innovation and industrial upgrading and aims to put some of the empirical 
findings in perspective by linking the development of the Chinese lifeboat 
industry to the upgrading of China’s industrial system. The fourth and 
final section of this introduction shed light on the fieldwork and 
methodological approach to learn about the far side of international 
business. 
 
The four articles 
In addition to this introduction the dissertation consists of four articles 
which all focus on the encounters and linkages between entrants and 
insiders in China. Figure 1 provides a visualization of the encounters in 
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scope and the articles examining them. Except for some cosmetic 
reformatting to fit the style of the dissertation, the published articles have 
not been altered. All articles included here are solo publications.  
 
Figure 1: The project design illustrated 
 
Article 1: Taking the mess back to business – studying international 
business from behind2  
‘Taking the mess back to business’ is a quite experimental, conceptual 
article which addresses the role of the qualitative researcher in 
international business (IB) studies and the need for a host country 
perspective to better comprehend the complexity and consequences of 
international economic activity. The article argues that the 
internationalization process is constructed at the doorstep where local and 
international actors meet and should thus be studied from both angles. 
The article provides some empirical examples and anecdotes from 
research in China to underpin the argumentation, but I’d like to 
emphasize that this is not an article exploring empirical questions; rather 
it is a call for new perspectives and for researchers of international 
business to rethink their approach to the field. The arguments are 
                                                 
2 Article (Hansen, 2008d) published in Critical perspectives on international business 
4(1): 42-54. 
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discussed in the voices of ‘the Geographer’ and ‘the Explorer’ – fictitious 
characters borrowed from Saint-Exupery’s novel ‘The Little Prince’. First, 
a theoretical critique of current research on international business is 
proposed by ‘the Geographer’, then I as author conduct an interview with 
‘the Explorer’ to learn how he experiences working as a fieldworker on 
the far side of international business. ‘The Explorer’ argues that more 
knowledge on how local actors evaluate and act upon international 
initiatives and the relations between entrants and locals may provide 
better understanding of realities and dynamics of actors in both camps. In 
order to achieve this knowledge, researchers of international business 
should go beyond the traditional sources of information (i.e. MNC-
managers) and also consult actors on the far side of international business 
(i.e. host country competitors, suppliers, customers etc.). By entering 
deeper into the field of study the researcher may be able to gain profound 
insight, but s/he will also become a more active ingredient in the realities 
being studied. 
 
Article 2: The far side of international business: local initiatives in 
the global workshop3 
‘The far side of international business’ is a more conventional and 
empirically grounded follow-up to article 1. The article presents a case 
study of the entry of two Norwegian lifeboat companies into the Chinese 
production system, but rather than merely studying the situation through 
the eyes of these two Norwegian companies, it includes a perspective 
from the far side of international business, i.e. the local competitors. 
Three questions are explored: 1) How do local companies evaluate the 
presence of international competitors in the local production system? 2) 
How is information and knowledge transferred between competitors as a 
result of this presence? and 3) How do international presence and 
knowledge transfers affect the evolution of an industry and the relative 
competitiveness of the participants? The article argues that to understand 
the dynamics and development of both international companies and 
localized production systems in a global economy, it is necessary to 
explore how international and local actors reflexively evaluate and act 
upon each other. The article then presents a model for studying the 
intersection between international actors entering somewhere and 
                                                 
3 Article (Hansen, 2008b) published in Journal of Economic Geography 8(1): 1-19. 
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localized production systems and the actors already there. This model is 
inspired by Malmberg’s (2003) and others’ call for new theoretical 
approaches that integrates international and local perspectives when 
conducting research on both international business and localized 
industrial development. 
 
Article 3: Entering local value chains: Upstream and downstream 
linkages in the midst of China’s shipbuilding industry4  
Whereas article 2 deals with the horizontal dimension of the actor 
entering a new production system, ‘Entering local value chains’ aims to 
explore how companies in the vertical dimension evaluate and act on the 
presence of an entrant in their domestic environment. The article takes 
one of the two Norwegian lifeboat producers from article 2 as a starting 
point, but rather than focusing on the entrant’s relations to competitors, 
this article looks into the value chain of the entrant to study how local 
suppliers and customers evaluate and act on the presence of an 
international company. This approach provides insight into a three tier 
fragment of the shipbuilding value chain. Upstream there are local second 
tier suppliers providing nuts and bolts for the foreign entrant as well as 
for local companies; downstream, there are shipyards buying lifeboats 
from the entrant as well as domestic suppliers. This article thus presents a 
slice of Chinese industry ranging from the small and locally anchored 
workshops supplying the entrant with various components, to the huge 
globally oriented shipyards buying some of the boats delivered from the 
entrant’s Chinese affiliate. Based on this fragment of the value chain and 
the contents of the linkages between its actors, I discuss how governance 
and upgrading in Chinese value chains take place and why foreign 
entrants and their ‘soft’ technology possibly play a different role than 
local companies. 
 
                                                 
4 Unpublished paper 
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Article 4: Karaoke or corruption – balancing diverging expectations 
and demands in international ventures5 
More than 120 Norwegian companies are established in China today. 
While article 2 and 3 explore local-international dynamics from a 
company perspective, this article focuses on how the Norwegian 
managers who are in charge of some of these companies walk the line 
between expectations and demands from the Norwegian headquarters 
with expectations and demands arising from both within the affiliate in 
China (internal issues) and from the business environment in which the 
affiliate operates (external issues). This in-between position is discussed 
in terms of the ‘cultural broker’ concept; in order to perform; the manager 
should not only comprehend both sides, but also act as a broker and make 
the two realities understand each other. Congruent with the far side-
approach, both Norwegian and Chinese informants were consulted. 
However, the focus here is to show how Norwegian and other expatriate 
managers in China communicate and deal with issues concerning 
diverging notions of corruption and ethical issues in the Chinese business 
environment, and also how conflicting standards regarding quality, 
human relations, incentive systems and distribution of responsibility 
within the company are central challenges to operating an international 
company in China. The empirical scope of this article goes beyond Le 
Bang and the lifeboat industry. This article is based on a review of 
existing literature as well as a number of my own interviews with 
Norwegian and Chinese managers and employees – mainly in the seafood 
and maritime industries.  
 
Opening the black box of international business 
The paramount theme of the four articles included in this dissertation is 
the encounter between entrants and insiders in China. In the first article, 
between the researcher and informants, second, between the entering 
company and new host country competitors, third, between the entering 
company and suppliers and customers and fourth, the encounter between 
expectations and demands stemming from the international ventures 
                                                 
5 Chapter (Hansen, 2008c) published in Making it in China, eds. Merete Lie, Ragnhild 
Lund and Gard Hopsdal Hansen, Høyskoleforlaget (Norwegian Academic Press). 
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home country and the expectations and demands of a new business 
environment.  
My research on these encounters has been guided by several theoretical 
approaches and strands of literature – some theoretical approaches are 
thoroughly discussed and commented in the dissertation, while other 
streams of literature play a more supporting role. To enhance my 
understanding of China I’ve been reading books and articles about 
Chinese history, economic development, culture and traditions and the 
odd ‘how-to-do-business-in-China’ book. Furthermore, to understand 
more of the international company, their challenges and solutions I’ve 
been looking into literature on human resource management (HRM) (e.g. 
article 4), intellectual property rights (IPR) (e.g. article 2), total quality 
management (TQM) (e.g. article 3) and a few other abbreviations. To 
better comprehend localized industrial development I’ve consulted my 
old home ground, economic geography, and read about clusters and 
national innovation systems (NIS) and, by global extension, global value 
chains (GVC) and global production networks (GPN); while at the same 
time impulses from my new work environment, the Department of 
Interdisciplinary Studies of Culture, have been trickling in and added a 
hint of science and technology studies (STS) and actor-network theory 
(ANT) to this theoretical potpourri. All along, my initial question – to 
find out how local actors evaluate and act on international entrants and 
the dynamics between insiders and outsiders – arose out of international 
business (IB) research and this tradition’s emphasis on the learning 
process of international actors. 
 
Mountains matter – and so do flowers 
In Antoine de Saint-Exupérys prominent publication from 1943 (Saint-
Exupéry, 2000), The Little Prince, the main character was travelling 
across the universe when he met an old gentleman living alone on his 
own planet, writing enormous books about geography. They engaged in 
conversation: 
’Oh, my home isn’t really very interesting,’ said the little prince. ‘It’s 
tiny. I have three volcanoes. Two active ones, and one extinct. Though 
you never know.’ 
‘You never know,’ said the geographer.  
Encounters on the far side 
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‘I also have a flower.’ 
‘We’re not interested in flowers,’ said the geographer.  
‘Why ever not? It’s the prettiest thing there!’ 
‘Because flowers are ephemeral.’ 
‘What does “ephemeral” mean?’ 
‘Geography books are the most precious of all,’ said the geographer. 
‘They never go out of date. It’s very rare for a mountain to move. It’s 
very rare for an ocean to dry up. We write about eternal things.’ 
‘But extinct volcanoes might become active again,’ said the little prince. 
‘What does “ephemeral” mean?’ 
‘It’s all the same to us whether volcanoes are active or extinct,’ said the 
geographer. ‘Mountains are what matter for us. And they don’t move.’  
The encounter between the little prince and the geographer paints a 
picture of geography and science in general as activities far from both the 
reality they claim to be about and the audience: the geographer writes 
about cities, oceans and mountains in the universe, but lives on a planet 
of his own and never leaves his office, and he won’t tell the little prince 
what “ephemeral” means. Further, the geographer establishes that 
geography is a discipline that’s not supposed to change, and that 
geography is about eternal things that don’t move, such as mountains. 
Today biogeography, i.e. the spatial patterns of biodiversity, is a sub-
discipline within geography – flowers, though still ephemeral, have 
become important as indicators of climate change – and climate has a 
profound effect on mountains. Geography and science in general have 
become less preoccupied with eternal truths about everlasting objects, 
turning to include research on more dynamic, ephemeral matters. 
Formerly ignored or excluded subjects may be integrated as sub-
disciplines and even contribute to the disciplines original core. The strict 
borders that surrounded geography have opened up – or at least they have 
been transformed. And it is ok to focus on objects less eternal than 
mountains – maybe it is the understanding that even mountains erode and 
change that has made this extension of topics possible. However, 
knowledge producers are still sometimes (seen as) sitting on their own 
planets observing and treating matters as if they were dealing with 
mountains on other planets. In this section the mountain is put forward as 
From salmon to lifeboats 
 9
a metaphor for the constant; a variable too often imposed upon situations 
and arenas where it does not belong. Flowers, on the other hand, signify 
the ephemeral, messy, irregular and maybe unexpected variables that 
inevitably occur when we study complex realities.  
 
The mountain remains… 
The work on the internationalization process of firms has provided good 
understanding of international companies, their activities and learning 
processes, but these approaches have rarely attempted to integrate the 
interplay between the international actor entering somewhere and the 
host-country actors already there (Welch and Luostarinen, 1993; Karlsen, 
Silseth, Benito and Welch, 2003; Lie and Lund, 2005; Wright, Westhead 
and Ucbasaran, 2007). The respondents informing research on 
international business are usually managers of MNCs and their 
subsidiaries, not the actors domestic to the environments being entered. 
The host country is, so to speak, put in a black box6 – its dynamics and 
internal complexity made invisible by the vast number of publications 
dealing with entrants and their activities. The internationalization process 
can be illustrated like this: 
 
Figure 2: The traditional understanding of the internationalization process 
                                                 
6 A black box is a concept referring to devices, systems or objects defined by their 
input and output, rather than their intrinsic characteristics (see for instance Latour, 
1999). 
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It is still the perspective and activities of the international firms’ that are 
accounted for in the recent empirical contributions to the 
internationalization literature: dynamic companies enter foreign markets 
and production systems, and harvest information, knowledge, profits and 
sometimes losses (see figure 2). In these studies, the impact of 
internationalization on the host economy, if any, is unidirectional; 
creating undulations that the international actors may adjust to without 
further ado, but the impact is never seen as something that might 
backwash on the international actor (see for instance Luo and Peng, 1999; 
Bell, Crick and Young, 2004; Blomstermo, Eriksson and Sharma, 2004; 
Carlsson, Nordegren and Sjöholm, 2005). Or, to stick with my geological 
metaphor; the country receiving international initiatives is still largely 
seen as a mountain where international firms can initiate business and 
gather knowledge and profits.  
 
Domesticating technology and international activity 
Lapérouse was able to put Sakhalin on a map, but the South Pacific 
cannibals that stopped his travel put him on their map! (Latour, 1987, 
229) 
The challenge to understand international-local linkages is then to 
acknowledge that internationalization is an interactive process including 
both entrants and host country actors, and invent some means to 
illuminate the dynamics of the relationship between the involved actors. 
The nature of relationships is also an issue in Science and Technology 
Studies (STS), for instance the relationship between use and design, or 
users and designers, of technology. While the traditional view on this 
connection would suggest that users adapt to the design provided, or for 
that matter, that designers actively try to adapt to meet users needs, the 
concept ‘domestication’, refers to the way users interpret and adapt 
technology to fit their needs, tastes etc. (Lie and Sørensen, 1996; 
Sørensen, 2006). To domesticate an artefact is to negotiate its meaning 
and practice in a dynamic, interactive manner and thereby integrate it into 
the structures, daily routines, and values of users and their environment. 
This negotiation implies that technology as well as social relations is 
transformed (Aune, 1996; Sørensen, Aune and Hatling, 2000; Berker, 
Hartmann, Punie and Ward, 2006). Domestication may thus imply that 
the user partially or completely breaks with the intentions – or “script” to 
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use Akrich’s (1992) concept – provided by the designer/producer. This 
break may be transient and trivial, as for instance if you use your pencil 
to scratch your forehead, or it may be of some consequence, as for 
instance when hackers renegotiate the use of computers and turn them 
into sub-cultural artefacts (Håpnes, 1996). Domestication is a notion 
closely related to Latours’ statement (1987, 29), the fate of what we say 
and make is in the later users’ hands. Users may adapt to facts and 
technology according to the intentions of the designer, but they may also 
adapt the facts and technology in accordance with their own need for 
facts or technology.  
Even though the application of technologies and international economic 
activities are processes working in different arenas, the interactive 
relationship that is fundamental to the domestication-concept is a 
perspective that should apply also to international economic activities. 
Economic systems are reflexive; the actors concerned explicitly question 
the organization, and based on an analysis of the organization’s 
functioning, try to conceive and establish new rules for the game (Callon, 
Meadel and Rabeharisoa, 2005, 28). As Sterman (2000, 10), a scholar of 
system dynamics pointedly asserts: 
We are not puppet masters influencing a system out there – we are 
embedded in the system… As our actions alter the state of the system, 
other people react to restore the balance we have upset.  
Latour (1987), Callon et al. (2005) and Sterman (2000) all point to the 
reflexivity of actions and the impossibility of placing oneself outside the 
circuit of events. Transferred to international business this means that any 
new entrant in a market or production system on some level alters the 
system which then again triggers responses from local actors affected by 
this entrance. Through commitment to foreign markets the firm becomes 
a participant in the very same market. The firm becomes bound to the 
market (Johanson and Vahlne, 2003). So, the international companies’ 
presence as knowledge producers and the actions they take on based on 
this knowledge may refuel the local actors’ knowledge and inform their 
actions. The domestication concept as used in technology studies 
represents an alternative to the established ‘active producer - passive 
user’ duality, and may be used in a similar way to dissolve the ‘active 
entrant - passive recipient’ dichotomy of international business studies. 
Learning occurs on both sides, and the locals may to some extent 
domesticate the presence of the internationals to become resources on 
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some level. Important to underline, ‘domestication’ in this context does 
not refer to international companies becoming more Chinese; 
domestication rather refers to the way the intentions and actions (script) 
of the entrant is received, translated and adapted to fill a purpose desired 
by the host country actors receiving foreign initiatives. In China, 
domestication of foreign direct investments has been a prevailing, 
articulated policy for decades – foreign companies have been invited to 
invest in China to benefit from low-cost production opportunities and an 
emerging market, and at the same time this invitation is – from a host 
country perspective – motivated by a desire to bring advanced technology, 
management skills, access to overseas markets and competitive pressure 
into China (Wu, 2005).  
The internationalization initiative should therefore be seen as a force 
causing a change in the local environment, as figure 3 illustrates. The 
encounter between internationalization and domestication creates erosion 
where new, unforeseen initiatives (illustrated as flowers) can grow, that in 
turn may erode and spur new initiatives also in the home environment of 
the international actor.  
 
Figure 3: A more dynamic understanding of the internationalization process 
To study international economic activity and in particular the 
internationalization process we need to open the black box which so far 
has contained the host economy. The internationalization process is a 
process in action; and the initiative to action is not a privilege reserved 
the companies that in the first place initiate activities in a foreign setting. 
The initiative may shift, and thereby the course of both the 
internationalization process and the local industrial development. This is 
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my main argument, and this is also the reason why I chose the passage 
from Latour’s Science in Action as an appetizer for this section. The 
French explorer Lapérouse was on a mission to map the Pacific and to 
learn about the people, natural characteristics and everything else that 
might be of interest to the king. Lapérouse was the subject, the one 
holding the initiative to action in his hands, but suddenly someone else 
grasped the initiative and Lapérouse became domesticated to an 
ingredient in the local cuisine.7  
 
From imitation to innovation: China’s economic miracle 
from a lifeboat perspective 
To this point I’ve argued that the linkages between international and local 
actors are important to understand development and dynamics on both 
sides of the internationalization process. In this section I will take a look 
at the contents of these linkages, what kind of effect they have on the 
participating actors and how domestication occurs in the encounter 
between entrants and locals in China. First, I will briefly discuss literature 
on innovation and catching-up strategies, then carry on with an 
introduction to China’s ongoing economic development and finally 
present an illustrated account of China’s journey from imitation to 
innovation from a lifeboat perspective. Although this dissertation mainly 
takes a company-level approach, this section aims to connect my own 
research to the national scale, examining the interdependency between the 
development of the Chinese economy and industrial system and 
development of indigenous companies through their linkages to each 
other as well as foreign actors.  
 
                                                 
7 Whether Lapérouse and his shipmates actually were eaten by cannibals is not an 
established historic fact. The expedition disappeared in the Pacific in 1788, and it was 
not until 1826 that an Irish captain found some remains from the ships. What had 
happened in between can only be surmised. 
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Innovation and proximity 
According to Schumpeter (1934), economic development has to be 
studied as an interactive process of qualitative change, not something 
bound within the individual firm and the distribution of resources. Along 
the same line as Schumpeter, Storper (1997) argues that the conservative 
notion of economic systems as machines, with hard inputs and outputs, 
must be replaced with a new guiding metaphor that see the economy as 
relations, the subjects of the process not as factors, but as reflexive human 
actors, and the nature of economic accumulation as not only material 
assets, but as relational assets.  
Research on innovations and innovation systems has established that 
linkages between firms and other firms and non-firm actors are important 
to understand innovation capacity – firms don't innovate in isolation, but 
in collaboration and interdependence with other actors (Kim, 1997; 
Boschma, 2004; Edquist, 2005; Altenburg, Schmitz and Stamm, 2008). 
Linkages are, intentionally and sometimes accidentally, used by firms to 
identify opportunities and challenges and to find new technological and 
organizational combinations to meet these opportunities and challenges. 
Innovation capacity is thus, to a large extent, a product of the density and 
quality of the firm’s linkages to other firms and non-firm actors. Density 
and quality of linkages is a matter of proximity – but proximity is more 
than geography. According to Boschma (2005) geographical proximity is 
neither a necessary nor an adequate condition for learning, but it may be a 
facilitator of knowledge creation by supporting other forms of proximity 
(cognitive, organizational, social and institutional) that contribute to 
enhance the density and quality of linkages and buzz between actors. 
According to Bathelt, Malmberg and Maskell (2004, 38) ‘buzz’ refers to 
the information and communication ecology created by face-to-face 
contacts, co-presence and co-location of people and firms within the same 
industry and place or region. Buzz may assist participants in the same 
value chain identifying relevant information and opportunities for 
cooperation with other actors, but proximity and buzz may also be an 
active ingredient in the horizontal dimension of an industrial place or 
region as it provides companies with opportunities for continuous 
monitoring and benchmarking against competitors (ibid.).  
Innovation is principally a process of differentiation from the competition 
(Crevoisier, 2004), but going beyond competitors is hard if they all dip in 
the same knowledge pool. Although proximity in its different forms is 
important there can also be too much proximity. Places and regions tied 
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together in networks of dense linkages may experience lock-in, 
embededness problems, lack of economic rationality and failure to 
recognize and accept novel ideas (Boschma, 2005). Consequently, 
innovations and the development of regions, clusters 8  and individual 
companies depend not only on the density and quality of local linkages 
and buzz, but also on their ability to establish pipelines to extra-local 
sources of knowledge (Bathelt et al., 2004; Boschma, 2005). While the 
local buzz of a certain industrial environment largely facilitates informal 
exchange of tacit information and intangible assets between actors who 
are familiar with each other, global pipelines are seen as more targeted 
efforts to obtain codified knowledge from distant and less familiar 
sources (Bathelt et al., 2004). The buzz-pipeline logic resonates well with 
Granovetter’s (1973) seminal work ‘The strength of weak ties’. 
Granovetter elaborates how information (e.g. rumors) moving through 
strong personal ties tends to be confined to a few cliques (since those 
linked by strong ties tend to share friends), but if the information moves 
through weak ties it can traverse greater social distance. The weak ties are 
seen as bridges to other cliques or environments. 
Bathelt et al. (2004) study buzz and pipelines from a cluster perspective 
and suggest that while buzz usually takes care of it self; building 
pipelines to reach external environments may require assistance, for 
instance from local policy makers. However, pipelines may also be 
initiated from the outside – for instance, by foreign companies entering 
the cluster or region in scope and thereby building a bridge between their 
existing network of customers, suppliers, competitors and other 
acquaintances and sources of inputs, and the new host country. Although 
researchers of local and regional development usually acknowledge that 
places and regions are not autonomous entities, but intertwined with and 
connected to other geographical scales and places, few empirical attempts 
have yet been made to merge the local with an international perspective 
in order to study insider-outsider dynamics in more detail (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002; Malmberg, 2003; Hansen and Kuada, 2006; Coe and 
Wrigley, 2007). In the international business camp, on the other hand, 
inward processes related to internationalization – i.e. how host country 
actors relate to incoming initiatives – have received equally little attention 
(Karlsen et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2007). Some relatively recent 
empirical contributions (e.g. Holm, Malmberg and Sölvell, 2003; Karlsen 
                                                 
8 A cluster is defined by Porter (2000, 16) as: a geographically proximate group of 
interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by 
commonalities and complementarities. 
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et al., 2003; Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2005) do indeed focus on the inward-
outward connection of internationalization and the impact of foreign 
subsidiaries on host country economies, but still without conducting 
empirical fieldwork on both sides of the local-international divide to learn 
how host country actors evaluate the entry and presence of foreign 
companies.  
 
Catching-up strategies 
A central question in research on innovation systems is to find out why 
some regions or countries are more innovative and adaptive than others 
(Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 2005; Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005). Like 
market shares shifting between firms, successful regions will increase 
their relative share in the (national or world) economy at the expense of 
lagging regions (Boschma, 2004, 1005). Hobday et al. (2001) suggest that 
the East Asian economies for a long time were cut off from the traditional 
sources of innovation and the pull from demanding users, but as a 
response these economies adopted and adapted novel organization forms 
and innovation strategies to overcome their difficulties and catch-up with 
the global leaders of various industries. Concepts like ‘catch-up’ and 
‘developing’ can easily be misleading as it connotes that the catching-up 
(or developing) country is simply copying the paths of others on its way 
towards a predefined goal. Although the practices of more advanced 
economies usually serve as a model for catching-up countries, what is 
achieved may differ a lot from the template and rather provide fertile soil 
for new initiatives and innovations (Kim, 1997; Hobday et al., 2001; 
Nelson, 2004).  
A particularly influential contribution to understand East-Asian industrial 
development is Linsu Kim’s (1997) comprehensive book Imitation to 
Innovation: The Dynamics of Koreas Technological Learning. According 
to Kim, the process of firms, industries and countries technological 
learning is so dynamic and complex that it defies simple analysis and 
frameworks. Consequently Kim presents a comprehensive framework 
composed by four sub-frameworks to analyze incremental and 
discontinuous learning at Korean firms. The first sub-framework 
examines the global technological environment and the interface and 
interaction between technology trajectories in advanced countries and 
catching-up countries and postulates that technological change in 
catching-up countries partly stems from the acquisition, assimilation and 
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improvement of foreign technology. Inherent in this understanding is that 
imitative activities may lead to a platform from which local adaptations 
and incremental innovations can emerge. Second, Kim includes an 
institutional sub-framework in which he identifies international, domestic 
and in-house sources of learning in newly industrialized countries. The 
third sub-framework highlights the learning processes at firm level. 
Understanding the intrinsic factors that make some firms more efficient 
learners is important because technological change in many ways 
depends on firms’ capability to absorb knowledge and information. The 
final sub-framework included in Kim’s paramount framework is about 
technology transfers from foreign companies. Technology can be 
transferred actively by means of foreign direct investments, consultancies 
and technical assistance, or it can be transferred passively through 
commodity trade, reverse engineering etc.  
Although Kim (1997) primarily analyzes technological learning and 
change on a microeconomic level (i.e. the firm), he emphasizes the 
importance of a holistic approach which also has to include macro and 
meso perspectives and the linkages and interaction between these levels. 
The innovation processes can be understood only by considering the 
multidimensional context (e.g. economical, political and cultural) and the 
multiscale context (local, national and international) in which they take 
place (Crevoisier, 2004, 374). 
While recognizing that the factors influencing national catching up 
processes are many and diverse, Nelson (2004) suggests that all 
successful cases of catching-up have at least included the following three 
elements: 1) considerable cross-border flow of people, 2) active 
government support of the catch up process, and 3) weak enforcement on 
intellectual property rights regulations. China has no problem meeting the 
terms above; Chinese students are going abroad in great numbers9 and at 
the same time foreign students and business people are coming to China; 
the Chinese government is dedicated to economic and industrial growth 
(Hansen and Kristoffersen, 2008); and intellectual property rights are still 
weakly protected (Hansen and Møller, forthcoming 2009). 
 
                                                 
9 China Statistical Yearbook (2006), table 21-8. 
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China’s turn towards quality growth 
At the onset of China’s opening towards the global economy in the late 
1970s, China’s technological competence was lagging far behind 
developed countries – as well as many other developing countries. 10 
China, still marked by the Great Leap Forward and the more recent 
Cultural Revolution, had only participated in the global circuit of trade 
and exchange of knowledge and ideas to a very limited degree, but this 
was to change dramatically in the decades to come. From 1978 to 2005 
government expenditure for science and research increased from 5.3 
billion rmb to 133.5 billion rmb (while the science and technology 
activities funded by Chinese enterprises in 2005 amounted to another 344 
billion rmb), the number of students graduating with a master or PhD 
degree from Chinese universities rose from 9(!) in 1978 to 189.726 in 
2005 and the total value of import and export increased 330 times, 
turning a two billion rmb deficit to an 837 billion rmb profit.11  
Foreign investments have been crucial to China’s development, building 
up the industrial sector and boosting technological and managerial 
competence. Reform of the domestic economy and opening to the outside 
world have been reinforcing each other and driving the fast growth of 
China’s economy (Wu, 2005). Over the past decades, the majority of 
foreign investments streaming into China have entered the labor intensive 
manufacturing industry, but recently this started to change and there is 
increasing investment in hi-tech sectors such as telecommunication and 
electronics in which the knowledge worker is a key asset (Raatikainen, 
2003). According to Professor Zhou Dunren (see Hansen and 
Kristoffersen, 2008), foreign investments have overall played a very 
constructive role in China’s development, but not all investments are 
good and it is now time for China to carefully reconsider what kind of 
investments to attract in order to achieve quality growth, rather than 
aiming for a double digit GDP percentage year after year. The Chinese 
government is strongly encouraging efforts to channel more foreign 
capital into the higher value-added and technology-intensive sector. In the 
words of Vice Premier Wu Yi, “We expect multinational companies to 
transfer the high-end link in manufacturing and research and development 
bases to China” (Zhu, 2006). 
                                                 
10 See IMF for a classification of developed/developing countries. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/groups.htm#oem 
11 China Statistical Yearbook 2006, tables 8-7, 21-8 and 18-3 respectively. 
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The Chinese economic miracle has for a long period been based on 
perspiration, but inspiration is now becoming more important (Professor 
Zhou Dunren to Hansen and Kristoffersen, 2008). Others have made the 
same observation. Xie and White (2006) analyze the period from 1949 to 
present (that is, 2006) and demarcate five stages in the evolution of 
China’s technical learning. The first four stages spanning the period from 
1949 to 2001 are characterized by an imitation paradigm wherein China 
in various ways aims to catch up with the rest of the world by imitating 
products and processes developed elsewhere. The fifth stage, however, 
beginning in 2001, represents a change towards creativeness in which 
Chinese companies and policy makers increasingly focus on developing 
technical and organizational knowledge in China and as a result several 
Chinese companies (e.g. Haier, Huawei, Lenovo, COSL etc.) are now 
entering into global competition.  
While still and quite fairly known as the home of cheap mass production 
and imitations, China is simultaneously becoming a tremendous force in 
the global economy bidding for oil contracts on other continents, sending 
out her own companies and brands to foreign markets and production 
systems, hosting the Olympics and even drifting her own space program.  
Recent high-profile international acquisitions and takeover bids by 
mainland Chinese companies have dramatically shifted media attention 
from spotlighting China as a ‘giant sucking vacuum cleaner’ for global 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI) to characterizing the country as a 
cash-rich ‘predator’ embarking on a global buying binge (Wu, 2007, 
445).  
The Norwegian business newspaper ‘Dagens Næringsliv’ (July 8, 2008) 
reported that China Oilfield Services (COSL) offered 12.7 billion NOK 
for the Norwegian offshore oil rig company Awilco. According to the 
newspaper, the Chinese bid is motivated by the “Viking Spirit” of Awilco 
as well as its social technologies and capital such as management, 
operational organization, employees and culture. 
Although there are still Chinese companies that with good reason can be 
accused of producing substandard quality, there is no longer any valid 
reason to generally disapprove of China’s technological competence. 
China’s development, which indeed is continuing, can be explained along 
a variety of trajectories: political explanations focusing at the capability 
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of the Chinese government, cultural explanations focusing at the energy 
and entrepreneurial mind of the Chinese people, economic explanations 
focusing at resources inherent urge to increase return on investment, 
international business approaches focusing on the inflow of foreign direct 
investments etc. All these explanations, sometimes standing alone, other 
times combined, can be studied from a bird’s eye perspective or zoomed 
down to a business or even individual level.  
 
Opening scene: From imitation to innovation  
In this attempt to illustrate and to some degree explain China’s economic 
miracle and her ongoing turn from imitation to innovation, I take a 
product perspective. The product chosen here is not a key product, as for 
instance the car, which is often seen as the outcome, as well as the 
driving force behind a highly complex and correspondingly global 
production system (or network); giving birth to grand concepts such as 
‘Fordism’ and Toyotas just-in-time philosophy defining both the 
production best-practices and to some degree the entire society of the 20th 
century. Lifeboats and their producers are never – reasonably enough – 
regarded as a force governing value chains, consumers, suppliers and 
customers across the globe. The lifeboat is located somewhere in the 
middle; it is obviously the outcome of its own value chain (as most 
products are), but enters into the shipbuilding industry and becomes 
attached to a ship where it usually has no practical purpose until the day 
something goes wrong.  
Lifeboats should not be in the news. They should be there to save lives 
when needed and out of the news when not. Unfortunately, all too often, 
lifeboats are in the news for the wrong reasons because people have been 
hurt using them. Part of the reason for that is simply that lifeboats are not 
just out of the news, they are out of sight and mind when there is no 
emergency (Røssland, 2006, 7).  
Although the lifeboat in many senses is invisible, there are significant 
differences with regard to quality; the better lifeboat requires little deck 
space, but can still save many people; the painting and technical details 
should be durable; the hook attaching the lifeboat to the ship has to be 
reliable and release when supposed to and hold when not etc.. 
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Inspired by Linsu Kim’s (1997) analysis of Korea’s industrial upgrading 
and my own fieldwork on the far side of international business, I’d like to 
present an illustrated four step account of industrial development from a 
lifeboat perspective. The four steps are deduced based on the source of 
knowledge contributing to industrial upgrading:  
• Imitation of products based on information in products.  
• Creative imitation based on other producers processes. 
• Partial innovation based on distant sources. 
• Radical innovations based on explorative activities. 
 
First act: Sourcing knowledge from products 
 
Figure 4: imitation of product based on information in products 
The existence of a product on the market may catch the interest of other 
actors sailing the seas of business opportunities. The company in the life 
buoy illustrates an entity so far uninvolved in lifeboat production that 
comes across a lifeboat and starts contemplating whether it can make 
money or not on the product. The first phase in voyage from imitation to 
innovation can be entitled ‘learning from products’ and the major sources 
of knowledge will often be the products of others. Technical knowledge 
is translated into artifacts (Pavitt, 2005) and some of this knowledge can 
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be recovered and learned through reverse engineering and careful 
examination of the product it self. According to a manager of a 
Norwegian lifeboat company, this is what happened in the Chinese 
lifeboat industry. In his words, it seems like the whole lifeboat industry in 
China is based on a model they brought to China in the early eighties to 
initiate cooperation with a Chinese company (see article 2). Chinese 
managers don’t agree that the story is quite that simple, but they willingly 
admit that they go to expos and take notes and photos of other lifeboats 
and, at occasions, have bought lifeboats from other producers to 
dismantle and reassemble them to learn how they are constructed. 
Although imitative activities may result in controversies between the 
original developer and the imitator (article 2), this kind of technological 
learning is usually legitimate as patents are uncommon or easily bypassed 
in many industries (Kim, 1997; Hansen, 2008b). However, this kind of 
technological learning was more common a few years ago, according to 
most of the Chinese managers. Duplicate imitation conveys no 
sustainable competitive advantage to the imitator technologically, but a 
considerable price advantage may be gained through lower R&D and 
wage expenses (Kim, 1997). The customer potential for Chinese lifeboats 
was for a long period restricted to domestic shipyards building for 
domestic customers. One of the Norwegian managers called this China-
China quality. According to Xie and White (2006) reverse engineering 
was particularly essential for the industrial development before 1978, but 
this mode of learning seems to continue into the 1980s and onwards – 
especially for first and second tier manufacturers which received less 
pressure and stimulation from both the Chinese government as well as 
foreign enterprises (article 3).  
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Second act: Sourcing knowledge from processes 
 
Figure 5: Creative imitation of products and processes based on information 
from other producers 
But there are limits to how much one can learn from the product alone. In 
the early phase of a company’s, industry’s or region’s efforts to initiate 
production of something, the products of more advanced competitors 
might be the best available source of input, but when the developing 
company (or industry or region) in the life buoy advances, it may also 
start looking at what happens at the competitors to learn how they do it. 
Companies imitating products based on the information embedded in 
other products will hardly be able to manufacture anything more 
advanced than a substandard copy – effective operation of many physical 
technologies requires the implementation of various ‘soft’ technologies 
(Burgess and Gules, 1998; Nelson, 2004).12  Soft technology includes, 
among others, management- and production practices such as just-in-time 
(JIT), total quality management (TQM), supply chain management 
(SCM), human resource management (HRM) etc. If the company in the 
life buoy has a sound understanding of how the product should be 
produced and how the production process should be organized, the result 
                                                 
12 Nelson uses the concept ‘social technology’ and applies it to discuss learning and 
industrial upgrading on a national, rather than company, level. However, Nelsons 
reasoning is easily transferred to a company level.  
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can be more or less as good as anybody else’s products. But, acquiring 
soft technology takes more than reverse engineering. Rather than being 
embodied in physical hardware, soft technology is found in 
organizational forms, production practices, standards, codes of good 
business behavior, public policies, customs, expectations and norms 
(Nelson, 2004). This kind of knowledge is neither easily codified nor 
traded and acquiring it may require interaction with bearers of soft 
technology. Furthermore, implementation of soft technology often 
requires systematic and substantial changes involving both the internal 
procedures and human resources of the company as well as its suppliers 
and customers (Burgess and Gules, 1998).  
This phase can be called ‘learning from processes’. The boat coming in 
from the left illustrates the second source of knowledge coming to focus – 
other companies and their methods. According to several managers in the 
Chinese lifeboat industry it is a good thing that the Norwegian companies 
entered China because now they can learn more about the production 
process, management practices, quality control, after-sales service and the 
global market (article 2). A small portion of this learning stems from 
locals observing the entrant, but the majority of soft technology transfers 
are credited job changes between the entrant and its competitors and the 
linkages between former colleagues. However, it is not fair to say that 
knowledge transfer is a unidirectional stream from the entrant to its 
competitors. Learning in the interface between entrants and locals is a 
process of mutual adaptation (article 1). Companies entering China have 
a lot to learn about their new business environment and much of this 
knowledge can be sourced from local partners and competitors (article 4).  
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Third act: Sourcing knowledge from distant pools 
 
Figure 6: Partial innovation based on existing knowledge sourced from distant 
knowledge pools 
A central notion in theories explaining innovative activities is that 
feedback loops between producers and demanding users are important 
drivers of innovations (Lundvall, 1988; Storper, 1997), but domestic user-
producer linkages seem to be weakly developed in China (Altenburg et al., 
2008). The island in the distance represents existing technology, forms of 
organization and customer preferences in the distance. In other words, 
sources of knowledge outside the firm’s immediate environment. The 
third phase of the upgrading firm (or region) may be to look further ahead 
and make use of existing technology, organization forms and customer 
preferences that can be utilized to become partial innovative. Although 
this stage is based on “old” innovations, introducing them for the first 
time in a new context can also be regarded as innovations. Furthermore, 
the diffusion of technology and organizational structure into new contexts 
often require a great deal of adaptation and may thus create a base for 
future innovations (Kim, 1997; Nelson, 2004; Fagerberg, 2005). The 
presence of Norwegian lifeboat companies in China is, according to the 
most advanced Chinese companies, something that contributes to 
integrate them into global networks as the entrants bring with them 
increased attention from international customers to the Chinese lifeboat 
producers – the entry establishes a pipeline between the Chinese 
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producers and external environments. Through this pipeline the Chinese 
producers may learn about customer preferences and receive direct 
technological and organizational input from demanding customers taking 
lead requiring suppliers to upgrade product quality as well as quality 
control procedures and organization. Research on local value chain 
linkages in the Chinese shipbuilding industry indicates that locally owned 
companies in China to a lesser extent than international companies take 
control of the value chain and make efforts to upgrade suppliers. But if 
Chinese companies increasingly adopt soft technologies, like supply 
chain management (SCM) and total quality management (TQM), this 
might change as these management strategies advocate the benefits of 
user-producer relationships, closer interaction in the value chain and 
governance of upstream suppliers (article 3). However, inputs of any kind, 
whether they are products, business initiatives or management strategies 
are always subject to a translation or domestication process in which 
actors evaluate how and why inputs should be assimilated and adapted. 
Just as one cannot expect any Norwegian firm to comprehend and accept 
textbook strategies perfectly and uncritically (see for instance Moltu, 
2004), one cannot expect Chinese actors to do so either. 
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Fourth and final act: Sourcing knowledge from explorative activities 
 
Figure 7: Radical innovations based on explorative activities 
The fourth and final source of knowledge to be found as part of this 
journey from imitation to innovation is new opportunities behind the 
horizon. By allocating some resources to explorative activities the firm in 
the buoy may aim for radical innovations. Being in stage four is not 
necessarily better or more profitable than being in stage three – or even 
stage two or one for that matter. In many cases, ‘good enough’ is better 
than ‘best’ (see article 2). The ‘technological frontier’ is a mythical place 
filled with uncertainty where no one knows which strategies will work 
and pay off (Langlois, 1989). Where a firm positions itself on this rough 
scale from imitation to innovation is related to access to knowledge, 
absorptive capacity, customer requirements, production costs, 
development costs, motivation and other more or less good reasons to 
develop or stick with the old solutions.  
A good example illustrating how apparently better ideas are ignored to 
the benefit of old solutions is the invention of the totally enclosed lifeboat. 
In August 1904, the young, Norwegian shipmate Ole Brude and three 
fellow sailors set out from Ålesund, Norway. The vessel was Brude’s 
invention ‘Uræd’ (Fearless), an 18-foot egg-shaped, totally enclosed 
lifeboat made of riveted steel. The destination was New York and the 
Encounters on the far side 
 28
purpose was to demonstrate the merit of the totally enclosed lifeboat over 
the traditional open lifeboat. They reached the shore of Massachusetts in 
January 1905 – both the craft and the crew was battered by storms and 
other trials, but the expedition was acclaimed a success. The boat was 
patented (Brude, 1906), but the business of producing totally enclosed 
lifeboats did not prosper at the early part of last century. Only 23 “Brude-
eggs” were ever produced. It was not until 1977, 73 years after the Uræd 
expedition and 29 years after Ole Brude’s death, that the Norwegian 
government mandated the use of enclosed lifeboats on larger vessels 
(Ellefsen, 2005). To be successful, an innovation must mesh with the 
complex system of production (and use) of which it is part. Sometimes 
this is easy because the innovation fits well with the existing system, 
other times the innovation is sufficiently radical to require significant 
changes elsewhere in the system. At the time of Uræd, maritime safety 
was presumably of less concern to ship owners and Brude’s ideas were 
obviously too far ahead of his time to win acceptance in the market – 
although proven to be the better solution (at least from the perspective of 
sailors in distress). 
A typical attitude in both the Norwegian and Chinese lifeboat companies 
is that since Norway is a high-cost country it is reasonable that 
Norwegian manufacturers concentrate on being leaders on technology 
and design, while Chinese manufacturers keep up by building decent 
quality for a low price. However, partly as a consequence of Norwegian 
companies’ entry into the Chinese production system, this division of 
labor has become more unclear. The Norwegians have enabled 
themselves to produce cheaper boats, while some of the Chinese 
companies have strengthened their outward linkages and innovation 
capacity, and initiated sales to more demanding and less price-sensitive 
customers. 
 
Summing up 
Although this account of Chinese industrial upgrading deals with a single 
product, it is quite illustrative of the upgrading process of the entire 
country and the role of foreign inputs as part of this process. Just as 
Chinese lifeboats previously were imitated based on information sourced 
from other lifeboats, a large share of Chinese industry were based on 
technology extracted from other products. Later on, both lifeboat 
producers and other industrial sectors increasingly focused on learning 
From salmon to lifeboats 
 29
technological know-how and management skills from the production 
processes of foreign companies present in China. All along, inputs are 
continuously translated and transformed to a Chinese context. Learning in 
the horizontal dimension can be described as a domestication process in 
which local competitors make use of the presence of the entrants to 
source knowledge and upgrade their own activity. This learning process 
is not part of the entrant’s strategies and intentions, and may thus be 
described as local competitors (users) going beyond the script of the 
entrant (designer). Learning occurs in the vertical dimension as well, 
especially between the entrant and its local suppliers, but as this learning 
process largely occurs in accordance with the entrant’s script, it does not 
to the same degree represent a domestication process as such. However, 
the local supplier may still transform and adapt the inputs intentionally 
transferred from the entrant.  
Recently, both a couple of the Chinese lifeboat producers as well as an 
increasing share of Chinese enterprises have expanded their outward 
activities and are now gradually more branding their own products and 
engaging more actively with international customers, production 
opportunities and external sources of knowledge. The Chinese lifeboat 
producers are not yet allocating significant resources to explorative 
activities aiming for radical innovations, but in other sectors (e.g. 
electronic and telecommunication equipments), both private enterprises 
(e.g. Huawei) and government institutions (e.g. Chinese Academy of 
Science) are making major efforts to look for new opportunities beyond 
the horizon.  
Similar to Xie and White (2006) remarks to their stage model, I would 
like to underline that the steps put forward here are by no means 
inevitable developments. Some firms or industries will always leapfrog 
the development, others will stay put and may still do well, and others 
may follow completely different trajectories to industrial development. 
There will always be a variety of factors informing and deciding business 
beyond sources highlighted here (and elsewhere). Nevertheless, the 
trajectory presented here is supported by both Chinese and Norwegian 
informants in the lifeboat industry who repeatedly established that 
Chinese lifeboat producers have moved from sourcing information from 
products, to sourcing information from competitor’s processes and more 
recently from demanding international customers. 
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Method and fieldwork 
Guanxi? They eat dogs and monkeys in Guangxi… But I don’t think they 
like salmon down there… 
The quotation above traces back to my first fieldwork in China. I was a 
master student; searching the Norwegian-Chinese salmon business for the 
infamous guanxi relationships. “Guanxi” is often used as a key concept to 
understand several aspects of the Chinese society and can be translated as 
‘relation(s)’. Guanxi is sometimes described as an asset with positive 
connotations, for instance, it is associated with having a lot of friends and 
a well working business network; other times guanxi is pronounced with 
a more negative undertone and coupled with features such as corruption 
and misuse of personal relations. Guangxi, on the other hand, is a 
province in southern China, well known for its exotic cuisine. I’m still not 
sure whether the quotation above is an example of a question ducking 
strategy or plain language trouble, but in this section, which will be 
dealing with methods and fieldwork substantiating this dissertation, I’ll 
be touching on both problems so it works either way. Methodological 
issues will be further discussed in article 1, and article 2 and 3 will also 
elaborate the production of empirical data. The purpose of this section is 
to give a general overview.  
 
The initial phase of the project 
I started this project with a clear idea that the encounters and relationships 
between international companies entering China and the local actors 
already there, had to result in some kind of dynamic change not only 
affecting the local actors, but also the internationals coming in. To study 
an encounter or relationship from one side only will most likely (or 
inevitably) result in bias and reinforced misunderstandings, so a premise 
from the very beginning was that this project would include fieldwork on 
both sides of the international-local divide. To study the encounters and 
relationship between internationals and locals, I needed a point of 
departure; an international company with ambitions, but relatively short 
experience in China. I was considering continuing studying Norwegian 
seafood companies in China, or perhaps some international entrants into 
the Chinese paper or aluminum industries, when I came across the 
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lifeboat company Le Bang. They showed interest in the project and 
allowed me access to their affiliate and personnel in China without 
requiring (or getting) sneak peaks into my material before I was ready to 
publish as planned. But more important than access to their in-house 
activities, was that this company worked as a starting point which 
allowed me to learn about the lifeboat industry in China and its actors.  
 
The fieldwork 
The fieldwork was mainly conducted in two periods. In the spring 2005 I 
spent seven weeks in China; most of this time I stayed in Qingdao and at 
Le Bang’s plant where I interviewed most of the managers as well as 
several workers and other employees (see section appendix for details). I 
was also allowed to participate in meetings and observe most daily 
activities without restrictions. In addition to Le Bang, another Norwegian 
company is producing lifeboats in China. I made several interviews in 
this company as well; both in the Norwegian based headquarters and at 
their plant in Jiangyin, a dense lifeboat cluster west of Shanghai. 
Following my stay in Le Bang I set forth to learn more about the local 
companies in the lifeboat industry, and how they evaluated and acted on 
the presence of Le Bang and the other Norwegian lifeboat producer. 
Although I didn't get access on the same level as I did in Le Bang, I was 
surprised to discover how frank and outspoken the managers of the 
Chinese owned lifeboat companies seemed to be. None of them painted a 
black and white picture of the lifeboat business or the foreign companies 
operating in China; even though some were quite negative to the entrants, 
they also had positive remarks (and vice-versa). They answered most 
questions, provided detailed accounts of certain happenings as well as the 
general situation in the business and they rarely gave me the evasive 
answer “hen nan shuo” (Eng. ‘hard to say’) which sometimes makes 
research in Chinese business environments frustrating. By interviewing 
actors that on some level knew each other I got the opportunity to focus 
on actual events in their competitive environment, rather than solely 
basing the interviews on abstract, general questions detached from their 
daily operations.  
In the autumn 2005 I went back to China for a longer stay. This time I 
spent nine months based in Shanghai to study language, write and to 
conduct more fieldwork. While the previous fieldwork period focused on 
Le Bang’s competitors, this stay was dedicated to reach their suppliers 
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and customers – as well as other informants who somehow could 
enlighten the dynamics between international and domestic actors in 
China. These informants included several Norwegian business people 
working in China, mainly in the maritime industry. I also conducted some 
in-depths interviews and had numerous informal conversations with 
Chinese students and young professionals to better understand how they 
saw their situation in a rapidly changing and increasingly international 
oriented job market constantly providing new opportunities and barriers.  
 
Qualitative approach 
My empirical data are mainly qualitative. I originally considered a mixed 
method approach (i.e., a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods), but concluded that the upside of such an approach would be 
relatively limited. The reasons are several: limited availability and 
reliability of both statistics and other information about the Chinese 
shipbuilding industry, the nature and complexity of the research questions, 
as well as the need for an approach that allowed for continuously re-
evaluation of questions as my own understanding of the area in scope 
improved. In any research endeavor, we must know enough about our 
subjects not only to ask questions, but to understand the answers. This 
depth of understanding is particularly important when conducting cross 
cultural studies. In quantitative research, cultural differences have to be 
addressed already in the design stage, while qualitative research allows 
for an integrated process of data collection and interpretation (Jones, 
2004). I didn’t know much about the maritime industry when I started 
this project. The shipbuilding industry, compared to other industries such 
as ICT, the automotive industry, pharmaceuticals, shoes, and apparels, 
has received very little attention from researchers of social and economic 
sciences. Few industries are as internationalized as those comprising the 
maritime sector, yet there exists few studies that deal particularly with 
this sector (Kind and Strandenes, 2002). To learn about boat and 
shipbuilding industry in China, and in particular the interaction between 
local and international actors, it was consequently necessary to go out and 
gather information more or less from scratch (see also article 1). 
However, as a side project I did in fact conduct a quantitative survey. The 
initial idea was to distribute a bilingual questionnaire to employees in 
both indigenous and international companies in China to learn about the 
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employees’ values and preferences regarding work and career, and how 
this possibly differed between international and indigenous firms. I was 
well aware of the optimistic nature of such an approach, but I thought it 
was worth a try. Several companies, both international and domestic, 
actually agreed to distribute the questionnaire among the employees, but 
when they were returned to me it was often obvious that many were filled 
out by the same respondents. At one occasion a HR-manager of a state-
owned shipyard even asked me how many responses I needed before he 
sat down to complete them all by himself.  
After all, I am the HR-manager and I know how my employees feel about 
these things, 
he said. Another problem was that many found it hard to understand the 
questionnaire. Administrative employees had no problem reading and 
completing it, but shop floor workers, who are not used to read on a daily 
basis, found it frustrating and time-consuming to make sense of my 
questions. The employee survey had to be discarded, but I conducted a 
similar and more successful survey including nearly 1.000 students at six 
of China’s top ranked universities. 13  The results, however, are not 
included in this dissertation.  
 
Collecting data in China - challenges 
To extract information and understanding from a business environment 
(as well as many other environments) is not an easy and straight-forward 
process. First, it is essential to somehow get an overview of the 
environment or situation in scope, the next step is usually to find some 
access to deeper understanding.  
China is frequently described as a difficult country for both business and 
research, but based on my research and limited business experience from 
both China and Norway I’d say that ‘different’ is a more accurate 
description. The crossing of national borders means that researchers, no 
less than companies, cannot assume that what works at home will work 
abroad (Marschan-Piekkari and Welch, 2004, 9). To arrange an interview 
                                                 
13 The universities are Fudan, Shanghai (n=198), Jiaotong, Shanghai (n=210), 
Zhongshan, Guangzhou (n=150), Huazhong, Wuhan (n=192), Qinghua, Beijing (n=92) 
and Renmin, Beijing (n=153). 
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in Norway, I call or send an email to potential informants, briefly 
describe the project and suggest a meeting. If the informant says no, 
there’s nothing to discuss. If s/he says yes, we’ll agree on time and place 
suitable for both parts. To arrange scheduled meetings some time in 
advance is harder in China – informants would often say something like, 
‘just catch a flight to Wuhan and call me when you arrive’. To travel for 
hours without having an exact appointment is frustrating, but usually it 
worked very well. Furthermore, when arranging an interview with 
Chinese informants it was often necessary to provide a more direct reason 
for them to agree to a meeting – for instance, by pointing to some 
common reference person or company, or perhaps the possibility that the 
interview somehow could result in future business opportunities.  
Language is a barrier for many foreigners in China. Most Chinese do not 
speak much English and Chinese is spoken in a variety of dialects. My 
own Chinese language skills are basic. I’m quite adept in restaurant and 
taxi jargon, other daily life operations in China are usually reasonably 
manageable (although misunderstandings are frequent), but to conduct an 
interview alone is far beyond my proficiency. Consequently, I worked 
with assistants who translated my questions and comments from English 
to Chinese and back again. I recruited master students at universities to 
join my fieldwork activities, and I spent quite a lot of time with them to 
get to know them, as well as to ensure they got a sound understanding of 
the project and the aims of the interviews. Some meaning is inevitably 
lost in translation, but by making sure that the translators were up to 
speed on the topics to be discussed and purpose of each interview, this 
margin of error was significantly reduced. This was clearly demonstrated 
to me in one particular interview where I hooked up with a new assistant 
only a couple of hours before meeting the informant – the result was not 
very useful. Anyone who has functioned as an interpreter will know that 
being regarded as part of the communication process with the goal of 
establishing a common understanding is vastly different from being 
treated as a machine that miraculously can transform one language into 
another (Thøgersen, 2006, 122-3). I also urged my assistants to pose their 
own questions and to function as a partner, rather than merely act as a 
medium for my questions. The active participation of my assistants 
sometimes contributed to a more relaxed and open dialogue as the 
informants understood that they could explain some topics directly to my 
assistants without taking too much consideration to the foreign researcher 
(see also Eckhardt, 2004). We used a tape recorder sporadically, but for 
the majority of interviews we trusted our joint note-taking efforts. As 
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soon as possible after the interview, we found some place so sit down to 
discuss the interview and write a detailed report. 
 
Targeted fieldwork and learning by living 
A qualitative fieldwork is a stratified endeavor. To carry out fieldwork is 
to recognize that relevant knowledge is situated in a certain place – 
somewhere outside your office (Sæther, 2006). To approach this 
knowledge one may identify certain informants or observation points and 
target these sources to capture meanings and facts about the situation in 
scope. These are the interviews and observations that are accounted for in 
the methods sections of academic publications. But before, between and 
after these targeted fieldwork efforts, other meanings and facts are 
captured that may be of great significance. Some of these meanings and 
facts may be directly relevant, reliable and valid pieces of information 
that contribute to enlighten the issue in question, but perhaps more 
important is the gradual learning process that help the researcher 
understand how to understand and further approach the research 
questions. Although most of the data I refer to in my work stem from 
targeted interviews, each stay and each month (about 20 altogether) in 
China have provided me with better understanding of how to conduct 
interviews, pose questions and interpret their answers. Furthermore, by 
doing research on China in China the relative closeness to issues in 
question also makes one more available for unexpected inputs. By staying 
in China I often met people, Chinese as well as foreigners, who, more or 
less out of the blue, provided me with tip-offs or inputs directly relevant 
for my research. In addition to the targeted interviews, other sources of 
background information and personal experience somehow relevant to 
carry out this project includes my master fieldwork conducted in 2001 
(Hansen, 2002), my own business adventures in China (e.g. dealing with 
t-shirts and advanced membrane technology for the Chinese fishmeal 
industry), research on Shanghai’s Xiangyang “fake market” (Hansen and 
Møller, forthcoming 2009), participation at a number of conferences, 
courses, expos, workshops and seminars in and about China and, last but 
not least, countless random (and occasionally arranged) encounters and 
small talk with students, business people, taxi drivers, waitresses, 
officials, academics, monks, bicycle repairmen, diplomats etc. 
The tables (1-4) in the section appendix list the targeted in-depth 
interviews conducted as part of this PhD project. In total this amounts to 
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42 interviews with 52 informants in 30 different companies or 
organizations. The names of the companies in the table are the fictitious 
names I have used in all of my articles included in the dissertation. The 
lifeboat companies are renamed after bars and restaurants in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Qingdao, while the suppliers and customers are renamed 
after the zodiac animals of the Chinese lunar calendar.  
 
Section appendix: List of interviews 
Table 1: Interviews with lifeboat companies 
Company Interviewee position (Nationality) Location Date 
Le Bang (Norwegian) General manager (Norwegian) Norway February 
2005 
 Plant manager (Norwegian) Qingdao April 2005 
 Production manager (Chinese) Qingdao April 2005 
 Sales manager (Chinese) Qingdao April 2005 
 Quality control engineer (Chinese) Qingdao April 2005 
 Senior engineer (Norwegian) Qingdao April 2005 
 Secretary (Chinese) Qingdao April 2005 
 Technical manager (Chinese) Qingdao April 2005 
 Purchase manager (Chinese) Qingdao May 2006 
 External sales agent (Chinese) Shanghai March 2006 
Red Capital Boat 
Building  
General manager (Chinese) Qingdao April 2005 
 Vice-director & sales manager 
(Chinese) 
Qingdao April 2005 
Constellation General manager & owner (Chinese) Wuxi April 2005 
People 6 General manager & owner (Chinese) Jiangyin April 2005 
Tanghui Lifesaving Sales subordinate (Chinese) Jiangyin April 2005 
 Vice director & owner (Chinese) Jiangyin March 2006 
Madame Zung General manager & owner (Chinese) Jiangyin April 2005 
Cloud 9 (Norwegian) HR manager (Chinese) Jiangyin April 2005 
 After-sales manager (Chinese) Jiangyin April 2005 
 General manager & owner 
(Norwegian) 
Norway July 2005 
Pegasus General manager & owner (Chinese) Jiangyin April 2005 
Totally 21 interviews with 21 informants
 
Table 2: Interviews with suppliers to the lifeboat industry 
Company Interviewee position (all Chinese) Location Date 
Horse Agent General manager & owner  Qingdao May 2006 
Sheep Copper General manager & owner Qingdao May 2006 
Monkey Copper General manager + production manager  Qingdao May 2006 
Rooster Steel  Vice-manager + production manager  Qingdao May 2006 
Totally 4 interviews with 6 informants
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Table 3: Interviews with shipyard and other lifeboat customers 
Company 
(owner) 
Interviewee position  
All Chinese, except one (see Shipyard 6) 
Location Date 
Dog Shipyard 
(CSSC) 
Purchase manager Wuxi March 
2006 
Pig Shipyard 
(CSSC) 
International business manager Guangzhou April 
2006 
 Purchase manager + assistant Guangzhou April 
2006 
Rat Shipyard 
(CSSC) 
Purchase manager Guangzhou April 
2006 
Ox Shipyard 
(CSSC) 
Business manager + senior engineer + visitor 
dept. manager 
Guangzhou April 
2006 
Tiger Brokering 
Firm (private) 
Vice general manager + manager of 
commercial dept.  
Shanghai April 
2006 
Rabbit Shipyard 
(CSIC) 
Business manager Wuhan April 
2006 
Dragon Shipyard 
(joint venture) 
Assistant manager, business dept. + senior 
manager, business dept. (Japanese) + purchase 
manager  
Nantong April 
2006 
Snake Official 
Agency 
Project manager + senior engineer, purchase + 
unidentified participant 
Qingdao May 
2006 
Totally 9 interviews with 17 informants
 
Table 4: Additional interviews conducted to learn about international companies 
in China 
Company Interview position 
(nationality) 
Location Date 
Norwegian 
Certification 
Project manager 
(Norwegian) 
Shanghai October 2005 
 Senior engineer (Chinese) Shanghai October 2005 
Norwegian Aluminum  Senior engineer (German) Suzhou December 2005
 HR-manager (Chinese) Suzhou December 2005
 Sales manager (Chinese) Suzhou December 2005
 Senior engineer 
(Norwegian) 
Karmøy 
(Norway) 
November 
2006 
Norwegian Cranes Plant manager (Norwegian) Shanghai February 2006 
Norwegian Ship Repair Site manager (Norwegian) Shanghai February 2006 
Totally 8 interviews with 8 informants
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Article 1: 
Taking the mess back to business – studying 
international business from behind 
 
 
A geographer is too important to go wandering about. He never leaves his 
study. But he receives the explorers there. He questions them, and he 
writes down what they remember. And if the memories of one of the 
explorers seem interesting to him, then the geographer conducts an 
inquiry into that explorer’s moral character. 
Saint-Exupery (2000 [1943], 45) 
 
This fairly comfortable view of what academic work involves belongs to 
‘the Geographer’, an old gentleman inhabiting a planet of his own, 
located in the universe of Antoine de Saint-Exupery’s novel The Little 
Prince. The business of this Geographer is the location of seas, rivers, 
cities, mountains and deserts, but he never leaves his office. The reality 
subject to this Geographer’s inquiries does not hide; the reality is singular, 
unambiguous and unchangeable, waiting patiently out there to be 
discovered by the Geographer’s explorers. 
We are both geographers, Saint-Exupery’s Geographer and I, but his 
understanding of how to conduct our mutual business seems quite distant 
from mine. My version of geography relates to other realities – I have no 
professional interest in the location of mountains and deserts. Instead I 
study the dynamics of economic interaction and internationalization 
processes, and to do this I sometimes have to leave my office and stay in 
chilly hotel rooms somewhere far away waiting for some potential 
informant to call me back – and I usually have plenty of time to conduct 
inquiries into my own moral character.  
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There are three voices, or subjectivities, that are trying to be heard in this 
paper: the Geographer (the theorist), the Explorer (the fieldworker) and I 
(the narrator). This is a story about methods and perspectives in 
international business (IB) research and how I combine the role of the 
Geographer with the role of the Explorer in order to create some mess 
and get a glance at some realities outside my office. The reality, I argue, 
is constructed and represented in the intersection between theory and 
fieldwork, between researcher and informant, and also, in the case of my 
own research, between the international and local actors who cross paths 
in the course of the internationalization process. We’ll soon question the 
Explorer, who is the main target of this little inquiry, but let’s first give 
the word to the Geographer so that he can give us a brief introduction to 
the topic. 
 
Notes by the Geographer: The externalities of the 
internationalization process 
Researchers attempting to understand complex realities tend to assign 
some substances, actors or processes a dynamic role, while other 
substances, actors and process are deported to the rim of relevance; this 
can be referred to as “framing”. But there are always relations who defy 
framing, and it is to these relations which remain outside the frame that 
economists apply the term “externalities” (Callon, 1998). They are 
defined by economists themselves as “net effects on parties other than 
those agreeing to buy and sell in a marketplace” (Pugel and Lindert, 2000, 
165). Economy is a discipline where the path to success and citations is 
often laid by inventing models and theorems so noiseless and universal 
that they work under all weather conditions (see for instance the widely 
acknowledged Diamond Model by Michael Porter (1990), or the 
infamous Growth-Share Matrix by the Boston Consulting Group (Stern 
and Stalk, 1998)). But what remains when the mess is cleaned away? 
When researchers try to squeeze heterogeneous and complex realities into 
expected patterns and formulas the result can be a holistic fallacy 
(Andersen and Skaates, 2004). The world is complex and messy, and 
sometimes we have to give up on simplicities to actually understand 
what’s going on (Law, 2004). The intention of this section is to propose a 
slight critique of the typical work conducted on the internationalization 
process of the firm as performed by economists, IB scholars and 
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occasionally economic geographers. Nevertheless, I think it is imperative 
to present a modest and introductory understanding of the concept that 
resonates with the traditional view and my coming critique of this work; 
“the internationalization process” refers to the development and 
continuing activities conducted by economic actors in foreign contexts.  
To explain the internationalization process Johanson and Wiedersheim-
Paul (1975) proposed a stepwise establishment chain in which a firm 
gradually increases its degree of involvement in foreign operations. This 
incremental development towards increased involvement abroad is 
founded on an ongoing learning process based on the firm’s new 
experience and information. Further, they argue that there is a close 
relationship between firm’s attitudes towards foreign activities and their 
actual behavior, i.e. whether and how firm’s attitudes materialize into 
action abroad (ibid.). Over the last three decades, numerous studies, 
employing various methods, have scrutinized how firms’ attitudes, 
experiences, social relations, physical resources etc. influence where, 
when and how they enter foreign markets and production systems (e.g. 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Coviello and Munro, 1997; Hassler, 2003; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 2003; Blomstermo, Eriksson and Sharma, 2004; Li, 
2004; Carlsson, Nordegren and Sjöholm, 2005). Internationalization 
research has so far had a strong bias towards outward operations, such as 
exporting, whereas it has given considerably less attention to the reverse 
side of these activities, such as importing (Karlsen, Silseth, Benito and 
Welch, 2003). Inward internationalization, such as imports of inputs or 
influx of competitors, may have a stimulating effect on a company’s 
skills and receptiveness regarding outward business activities (Bell, 1995; 
Bell, Crick and Young, 2004). The entry of foreign firms from developed 
markets not only imposes pressures on local companies to proactively 
learn, but also provides an opportunity for local actors to acquire 
knowledge (Hitt, Li and Worthington, 2005). When international actors 
initiate activity in a foreign context they also submit their initiative to the 
new context. Economic systems are reflexive; the actors concerned 
explicitly question the organization, and based on an analysis of their 
functioning, try to conceive and establish new rules for the game (Callon, 
Meadel and Rabeharisoa, 2005, 28). It is apparently acknowledged that 
the far side of the internationalization process, i.e. the local actors, are 
factors that very well may influence the operations of the international 
actors, but the informants enlightening the internationalization process 
are nevertheless always the representatives of the firm going international, 
mostly the top managers. Consequently, the realities that emerge in these 
studies are those of the firms entering foreign markets and production 
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systems; the realities of the local actors, how they act upon the reality as 
they see it and how their interpretations and actions may affect the 
international actors are apparently seen as irrelevant to understand the 
dynamics of the internationalization process.  
Earlier, I presented a broad understanding of what the internationalization 
process is. Based on the short discussion above, I find it productive to 
reframe this understanding to include local learning processes as 
externalities that indeed are relevant to the dynamics of the 
internationalization process. Thus, the internationalization process is 
enacted1 by international actors initiating new activities overseas and the 
actors of the host economy receiving initiatives from abroad. 
So, how should the internationalization process then be studied? Wright 
(1996) writes that qualitative research offers answers to messy problems 
and complex issues that are typical for international management research. 
Nevertheless, qualitative approaches are still greatly underrepresented in 
international business research, merely accounting for about ten percent 
of the published work (Andersen and Skaates, 2004). Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, an approach that integrates international and local 
perspectives to understand the internationalization process, industrial 
transformation and dynamics has not been developed (see Malmberg, 
2003). According to Holstein and Gubrium (1997) qualitative inquiry is 
especially sensitive to representational matters because of its unique 
position at the lived border of reality and representation. “Lived” 
signifies the actual locations within the lifeworld where those things, 
events, and circumstances that people experience are meaningfully 
described and conveyed, to one self as well as to others (ibid.). Knorr-
Cetina (2005) uses the concepts “reflexive” and “pre-reflexive” to 
describe the realities and dynamics of the financial market. The pre-
reflexive reality is the reality as seen by an observer, who has the 
opportunity to communicate this reality to an audience which will then 
see a reflexive reality and get the opportunity to react to it. In the 
financial markets studied by her, the reflexive mechanism and “projection 
plane” is the computer screen, but this screen is not just a device for 
monitoring the market; as hundreds of thousands of traders act and react 
to each other, this screen has become the market – a system that 
effectively eliminates the pre-reflexive reality by integrating within its 
                                                 
 
1 Law (2004) explains ‘enactment’ as the claim that relations, and so realities and 
representation of realities are endlessly brought into being in a continuing process of 
production and reproduction. 
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framework all relevant venues of the specialized lifeworld of financial 
markets (ibid., 127). However, Knorr-Cetina does not argue that all 
markets and their pre-reflexive realities have been consumed by the 
computer screen, and that is certainly not the case for the markets, 
business systems and internationalization processes mentioned in this 
paper. What I try to grasp from her way of seeing it is the importance of 
considering the market and any reality as continuous processes shaped by 
the actors acting and reacting on it (see also Callon, 1998). The answer to 
the question how should internationalization be studied is simple and yet 
quite difficult – to study the dynamics of the internationalization process 
it is necessary to focus on the relations, the realities and the 
representations of realities brought into being by actors on both sides. By 
including the local’s perspective in my research on the 
internationalization process I intend to take home some of the mess and 
complexity I think belong in IB and economic geography. 
 
Exploring the far side of the internationalization process2 
To this point most of this text has been in the hand of the Geographer. 
Now I think it is time to question the Explorer so that he can explain how 
he experiences working in the mess created by the Geographer. 
Interviewer (I): Cheers, my dear chap! Could you explain to me…? 
Explorer (E): Our3 intention is to study the internationalization process 
in a frame that includes the perceptions and activities of actors on both 
sides of the border. This approach was chosen because we believe that the 
dynamics of the internationalization process is closely linked to the 
dynamics of the receiving economy, and that the development of the 
entering firm, the internationalization process and the receiving economy 
are mutually informed and enacted by all involved actors. In other words, 
we are trying to learn how reality is represented on the far side of the 
internationalization process, and how the representations of realities on 
both sides interact. Our practical approach to learn about this is to start 
out with a Norwegian manufacturer of marine lifesaving equipment who 
                                                 
2 In this section, which is an interview with the Explorer, references are put in 
footnotes in order to let the Explorer give his version of reality without too much 
interruption.  
3 Since the Explorer is subordinate to the Geographer he will occasionally refer to 
himself in plural; giving credit to the Geographer.  
Encounters on the far side 
 50
recently established production in China, but rather than merely 
consulting the managers of this company, we also go to their competitors, 
customers, suppliers and employees to learn how they evaluate and act 
upon the situation including a new, foreign player. 
I: I was actually going to ask… 
E: Of course this Norwegian company had, and still has, a lot of 
expectations and ideas about what China is, what kind of possibilities are 
waiting to be utilized, what kind of threats and challenges are lurking 
around and so on. To cope with these possibilities, threats, challenges and 
other eventualities the company has strategies. However, the local 
companies in the Chinese lifeboat business also have a lot of expectations 
and ideas about the possibilities and challenges emerging from the entry 
of a new company into their home market and production system. And of 
course – they have strategies too… 4  We have no intention of 
romanticizing the role of the local actors. But in our view; studying the 
internationalization process without taking into account the locals’ role 
and self-awareness is like studying the meteorological phenomenon rain 
without considering the role played by the sun. 
I: Yes, I already know about this double perspective of yours. The 
internationalization process is a construction emerging as a result of 
interaction between international and local actors, but what I’m really 
interested in is how you actually proceed to study this? 
E: …We’re mostly into qualitative methods. 
I: Could you please give me some more… Your employer, the 
Geographer, claims that he is going to bring the mess back to business. 
How do you cope with this mantra in the field? 
E: He might sound a bit pretentious sometimes. But on a more prosaic 
level this approach implies that we are doing interviews with open 
questions trying to gather the stories of both the entering Norwegians and 
the local Chinese actors to understand the dynamics of the 
internationalization process. To trigger informants’ knowledge and 
opinions we focus on actual events, rather than actors and structures, and 
probe these events from different angles in interviews with different 
informants. Another quite obvious point is that informants in a 
                                                 
4 See Hansen (2008) to learn more about how the Chinese lifeboat companies evaluate 
and act upon the presence of Norwegian competitors in China.  
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competitive landscape tend to articulate stories quite differently 
depending on their position. This is not necessarily because they want to 
paint a favorable image of their own business; it is often just a matter of 
different perspectives and references. Triangulating data by interviewing 
and challenging different actors about their views on certain events serves 
both to strengthen validity and reliability. We want to ensure that the 
different ways of observing an event are taken into account, and further, it 
allows us to reconsider our expectations and approach to the phenomenon 
in scope. 5  While conducting fieldwork, I do not follow a strictly 
predefined scheme telling me where to go and who to ask about what. It 
is more like being a detective following clues and leads to identify events 
and relevant actors in the industry, to understand their way of seeing the 
reality and finally to learn how they act upon their understanding of the 
reality. The data I collect are not necessarily fit for a complicated 
econometric analysis, but they are pieces of a big picture that the 
Geographer and I put together to construct a version of a reality which is 
supposed to include a perspective seen from the far side. You see, writing 
and presenting interview data is in itself an analytical active enterprise.6 
I: But what spurred your interest in the reverse side of international 
business? Maybe you can give me some of the background for your 
messy approach to researching these issues? 
E: Nowadays we’re studying Norwegian companies manufacturing 
marine lifesaving equipment in China, but this is not the first time I have 
worked for the Geographer. Some years ago we went to China to study 
how Norwegian salmon exporters were adapting to Chinese market.7 It 
started out as a rather traditional study of the internationalization process, 
focusing on the experiences of the Norwegian firms, but after a while it 
became clear to us that the internationalization process and success of 
Norwegian salmon was influenced by more than the Norwegian 
companies’ ability to learn and adapt to a set of existing characteristics 
and preferences in the Chinese market. The local actors and their 
characteristics, capabilities and preferences were adapting as well in a 
close and reflexive relationship with the entrants. 
                                                 
5 See Andersen and Skates (2004) for an interesting discussion on validity in 
qualitative international business research. 
6 Holstein and Gubrium (1995, 80). 
7 Hansen (2002; Hansen, 2005). 
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I: How come? Could you provide some empirical examples to illustrate 
how changes in the behavior of local actors have an effect upon the entry 
and activity of foreign multinationals in China? 
E: Salmon was introduced to the Chinese market by the Norwegian 
Seafood Export Council and some Norwegian companies in the second 
half of the nineties. The Norwegian companies exported their products to 
the Chinese wholesalers of seafood and the initiative was in the 
Norwegians’ hands to begin with. However, the Chinese wholesalers, 
informed by and of the Norwegian entry, soon learned about the situation, 
possibilities and threats and grabbed a larger proportion of the initiative 
in this trade relation. In China, which is still regarded as a country with 
rather weak legislative protection,8 relationships are very important to 
conduct business. Thus, when the financially stronger Norwegian 
companies established representation offices in China, allegedly to learn 
about market preferences and improve cooperation with the Chinese 
wholesalers, many locals saw this as a threat to their own position in the 
value chain. A number of them chose to avoid contact with the 
Norwegian companies’ representatives in order to keep their main 
competitive advantage, that is, local knowledge and relations, out of 
reach of the new entrants. The locals decided to see the Norwegian 
entrants as potential competitors, rather than business partners, which was 
how the Norwegians intended to be perceived. The salmon trade in China 
is today generally controlled by the local actors and of course by the 
international supermarket chains present in China, despite efforts made 
by the Norwegian actors to regain control over prices, quality, outlets and 
the image of salmon.  
I: Ok… 
E: This time the Geographer and I take a Norwegian owned lifeboat 
company established in China as a starting point and try to figure out how 
the local actors, such as competitors, suppliers, customers and employees, 
evaluate and act upon the presence of this company, and then how this 
has an effect on the development of the Norwegian company. The point is 
that learning and initiative are not reserved for the actor that makes the 
first move into a foreign economy; actors of the receiving economy may 
learn and act too, and learning and action on both sides influence the 
relationship between the actors – a dynamic, reflexive relationship called 
the internationalization process. 
                                                 
8 Luo (2006). 
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I: But knowledge is not free, and you say that some of the Chinese 
companies even regard it as their main competitive advantage, so how do 
you earn it? Why should the Chinese managers give an interview and 
share some of their capital with an academic from the same country as a 
major competitor simply because the academic, who might be an 
industrial spy, says ‘please’?  
E: Well, even though my informants usually share a lot, they still keep 
secrets. I think there is a mixture of reasons for why they actually agree to 
meet me in the first place. These people, the Chinese managers, are busy, 
and there is really no profit in being interviewed by foreign academics. A 
useful way to mull over this issue might be to reflect on what kind of role 
they assign to me. Chinese businesses are not, like Norwegian businesses, 
run down by hordes of students and researchers conducting enquiries and 
I believe they find my approach to research rather alien from what they 
are used to. Of course I’m met by suspicion, but also curiosity. I found 
that some of the Chinese companies actually had substantial knowledge 
about my project, my research questions and my whereabouts several 
days before I made my first contact. I remember an episode when I 
thought it was time to step out of the shadows and actually call the 
English-speaking sales and marketing manager of a Chinese company 
very important for my investigations. My efforts to present myself and 
my project in a most laudable manner were abruptly silenced by a “Yes-
yes-yes-yes, I know who you are… I know who you are!” So you see, it is 
hard to be a secret academic agent in China, but on the other hand, if I 
had come to this Chinese company out of the blue, they would probably 
not have accepted my invitation for a meeting. Thanks to the inter-firm 
business relations that revealed my true identity before I decided to do so 
myself, the Chinese company got the understanding that I was a person 
who already had some knowledge about the industry and that I knew 
some of the people in the business. By meeting me I think the Chinese 
managers somehow hoped to pollinate their own stock of knowledge 
about the present business situation. I think the Chinese companies 
looked at me initially as some kind of industrial spy from Norway, as you 
suggest, but as the locals’ “contra-espionage” proceeded, I think they 
started seeing at me as some kind of broker – a person with knowledge 
and connections on both sides and I was occasionally encouraged to pass 
on messages and opinions to the competitors.9 
                                                 
9 See also Scapens (2004) for related experiences.  
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I: According to Holstein and Gubrium10 it is the interviewer’s task to 
activate different aspects of the informants stock of knowledge, and that 
the informant’s narrative position may shift several times in course of the 
interview; how do you proceed to get the best out of your informants? 
E: Some of my informants were cautious to begin with. If I asked about 
something, like for instance their opinion on international companies 
entering China in general, they’d just clear their throats and declare 
something like ‘we welcome competition!’ and they would typically 
continue by providing a lot of facts about market shares and product 
assortment. They took the role as the representative, speaking from their 
company’s information brochure. 11  To trigger the stories behind the 
representative’s factual and glossy version of reality I found it essential to 
create some kind of involvement by discussing actual events and 
incidents in their business environment. Rather than conducting an 
enquiry into the moral character of the informant in front of me, I often 
ask about his or hers perceptions of the other players in the business.12 
One of these incidents was the turbulent life and death of a certain joint 
venture – a tale casting villains and victims from Norway, Singapore and 
China. The different stories about this episode are interesting per se, but 
in my research these stories are even more interesting as evidence of 
realities, relations and dynamics I would never have discovered without 
bringing this event into the interview arena. Denzin13 said, and I think 
Holstein and Gubrium would agree, that the interview is a way of 
bringing the world into play and the interviewer and interviewee have to 
work together to make this play come about. It might be useful to think of 
each interview as an isolated event, to team up with the informant and try 
to construct a mutual version of the reality. Sometimes it is necessary to 
share opinions, provoke and challenge; other times the trick is just to be a 
good listener – to let the informant talk and give some vague response 
once in while.  
I: Aha… interesting… hmmm…14 
E: By the way, I’d like to make a distinction between two qualitatively 
different kinds of data deriving from my methods in this context. First, 
                                                 
10 Holstein and Gubrium (1995, 33). 
11 See also Easterby-Smith and Malina (1999) for a similar account of doing 
interviews in Chinese companies. 
12 See also Fang (1999) for some similar observations. 
13 Denzin (2001). 
14 The interviewer is talking notes, giving the Explorer some room to continue. 
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there are the data provided by the actual interview, questionnaire or 
whatever method being employed. This category of data includes the hard 
facts, the statements, opinions and feelings expressed, as well as the 
information found somewhere between the lines. In other words, the 
information transmitted to me or constructed by me and the informants. 
But my research methods also provide first hand experiences as I operate 
as a knowledge producer in a context inhabited by other knowledge 
producers. I am a Norwegian researcher studying the horizontal and 
vertical relationships of a company from my home country in China and 
unsurprisingly, in the eyes of my informants, I become some kind of 
representative of this company for good and bad. This became evident 
when I move up and down in the value chain: the small companies 
supplying the Norwegian lifeboat company were always very welcoming 
as they saw me as a delegate from an important customer; the competitors 
of the Norwegian company were more suspicious, but also curious and 
polite; while the customers, the big Chinese shipyards, were rather 
unimpressed by my presence as they probably would rather cooperate 
with the cheaper Chinese lifeboat suppliers. To gain some interest by the 
Chinese shipyards I had to get a letter of recommendation from the 
Norwegian Ship-owners Association which stated that they were 
interested in the results of my research.  
I: So you are saying there are some similarities between your work as a 
researcher and the processes you are actually studying?  
E: Yes, whether you are a company entering a new market or production 
system, or a researcher entering any kind of research context, you have to 
remember that by entering an arena you also become a player in the arena. 
My own experiences, failures and successes in this business environment 
also provide valuable insights into the workings of this business 
environment, the relations and the function of those relations. What a 
scientist observes is not independent of the process of observing, but an 
outcome of the scientist’s methodological interaction with, and 
conceptual constitution of, his or her objects of knowledge, contrary to 
the more positivistic stance in which a researcher is a neutral collector of 
data.15 Just as we claim that the internationalization process is enacted in 
the relationship between the entering company and the companies in the 
receiving economy, the researcher’s reality is constructed in the 
relationship between the interviewer and the informants. 
                                                 
15 Cassel (2005). 
Encounters on the far side 
 56
I: I see… So would you say that research activity and fieldwork as such 
potentially may merge with the informants reality and perhaps inflict 
changes in the environment being studied? 
E: Yes indeed. That’s what I meant by pollinating; by flying between 
flowers collecting pollen, the bee also contributes to the flowers 
reproduction. The researcher is similar to the bee in the sense that he or 
she moves around to gather information, but simultaneously leaves 
something behind. To give a mundane illustration of the traces you leave 
behind as a researcher in a foreign setting I’d like to draw on one of my 
own experiences. When I did most of the fieldwork on the horizontal 
dimension of the Chinese lifeboat industry I was working closely with a 
Chinese assistant. We were a good team, my assistant and I, but less than 
a year later, while my own results still were being reviewed by some 
strict referees, I found out that my assistant quite unexpectedly already 
had published some findings in a Chinese journal.16 This article, however, 
focused on how the Chinese companies should meet the competition from 
foreign entrants. At first I found the existence of this piece a bit annoying, 
but soon I realized that this was nothing but a good example of how 
foreign initiatives, like my own research, always leave some traces that 
locals may act upon. I read somewhere that methods, their rules, and even 
more methods’ practices, not only describe, but also help to produce the 
reality that they understand.17 This is what the distinguished economic 
geographer and expert on Chinese capitalism Henry Yeung became aware 
of and confessed in his keynote speech to the annual meeting of Finnish 
geographers: “I realized that I was more than just an academic researcher 
who produces knowledge on Chinese capitalism (…) The totally 
unexpected coverage of my views on Chinese family business by three 
highly influential media products18 made me aware for the first time that 
academics could be an important actant, in the words of actor network 
theory, in shaping the ways in which business community operates”.19 A 
similar point is made by Michel Callon,20 who says that economics, in the 
broad sense of the term, performs, shapes and formats the economy, 
rather than observing how it functions. John Urry21 makes the same point: 
“practices of investigation themselves produce complex effects upon the 
                                                 
16 See Dai and Zhou (2005). 
17 Law (2004, 5). 
18 The three influential media products were The Financial Times, Far Eastern 
Economic Review and CNBN. 
19 Yeung (2004, 6-7). 
20 Callon (1998). 
21 Urry (2003, 37). 
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system in question, in cases resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy where 
research findings help to bring about the very effects that they are 
themselves investigating”. The Geographer and I are not distinguished 
academics like Henry Yeung, Michel Callon and John Urry, but our point 
is the same: we must include all the participants, including the researcher, 
as dynamic actors that to some extent take part in the enactment of the 
focal process. The entering company and their methods to conduct 
business interact with actors in the market and production system being 
entered, and the researchers studying this process produce a 
representation of reality that is a product of the interaction between the 
researcher and informants. And further that both the making-of and the 
product, that is the reality presented, may merge with the reality ‘out-
there’.  
I: So by extension this implies that the interview I now am conducting 
with you as the informant on some level or another may have 
consequences for your work. What do you think about that? 
E: I guess you might have a point… To ask good, relevant questions the 
interviewer sometimes has to provide some facts or opinions, and based 
on these facts or opinions the informant to some extent might be assisted 
in a short escape from his or her embedded logic and see the reality from 
another angle. It’s like therapy… Some of the questions you have been 
asking make me re-evaluate my own work in new terms, and that may, 
indeed, have some effect on my future activity. Thanks by the way… 
I: Oh, never mind… and thank you for answering my questions! Let me 
just ask you one more before we call it the day…  
E: Aia… the final question is usually the tricky one… 
I: Nah, it’s not too bad, I think. I’d just like to ask you to summarize 
some concrete suggestions for other researchers in IB and what you think 
should be the direction of future efforts in international business studies. 
E: That’s two questions, I believe… Well, I’ll start with the latter. What I 
find inadequate, not to say boring, is that researchers of the 
internationalization process and IB as such, appear to have forgotten how 
to ask good and interesting questions. It seems to me like researchers first 
consider what kind of data is already available or, at best, what kind of 
data is easiest available, and then formulate some kind of tailor-made 
question. This results in a heap of studies confirming that experience and 
cleverness is positively correlated with corporate performance and the 
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like. Instead of this approach, I think that IB studies needs to rediscover 
curiosity. I won’t say that the far side of international business is the only 
area where blank spots remain, but I think a lot of good questions are yet 
to be explored on the relationship and dynamics between companies 
entering somewhere and those actors already there, and I would therefore 
like to encourage others to follow this lead. It is our job as researchers to 
produce data, not merely process them. By ‘produce’ I don't mean 
fabricate or forge, but rather to invent ways of making other realities 
visible. That brings me to your first question – how can it be done? To 
give you some concrete suggestions and bullets for your list I’d start by 
saying that questions, here understood as fascination for a topic rather 
than expectations and rigid research questions, should come first. Next, I 
think the researcher should consider a variety of methods and their 
combinations to feed his or hers curiosity. Even though we for the most 
part have been talking about qualitative methods, I’d also advocate using 
quantitative methods whenever that seems to be the best way to explore a 
certain relationship. Third, I’d like to repeat the point we made on 
activating the informants stock of knowledge. In the course of a research 
interview, the interviewer and informant generate a shared context for the 
exchange of experiences, ideas and meaning.22 This shared context can 
intentionally and accidentally be influenced to incite stories that 
otherwise would remain untold. Fourth, this influence should be carefully 
considered when conducting fieldwork, but also later while analyzing and 
presenting the data. Just as we argue that reflexivity is a factor 
influencing the relationship between local and international business 
actors, it is also a factor influencing relationship between the researcher 
and the informant and the data coming out of it, and in some cases even 
the business reality being studied. My fifth and final suggestion is to 
make use of the role as an outsider when conducting research on insider’s 
relationships with other outsiders, and try to see the parallel between your 
role and the context being researched. Well, it’s getting late – any final 
final questions? 
I: Nothing further… And again, thanks a zillion for spending so much 
time on me! 
E: You’re welcome… By the way, did you have lunch before our meeting? 
I: No, I’m actually starving! 
                                                 
22 Marschan-Piekkari, Welch, Penttinen and Tahvanainen (2004, 246). 
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E: Good, I know this place, it’s called… well, I don't remember the name, but they serve dog meat in 
aspic, if you like… 
I: … great, I’ll pay, of course… 
E: Oh no, I’m inviting! 
I: Ok, then… 
E: By the way, did I tell you about the time when I… 
 
Conclusions 
The best stories always come alive when the tape recorder is shut off and 
the notepad stuffed away. Yet, it is time to let the actors in this little play 
go to lunch, and reunite the voices of this essay into one. The critique put 
forward in this paper is not something that exclusively applies to the 
studies of the internationalization process; similar arguments regarding 
biased information sourcing could be applied to a number of academic 
disciplines. As researchers studying complex realities we can always 
consult additional sources, invent new questions and approaches, disturb 
the daily routines of just one more manager or distribute questionnaires to 
even larger samples. Yet, we will never capture the full complexity of the 
situations and phenomena we attempt to study. What we can do is to 
occasionally reframe the realities in scope, leave our studies and take a 
look at the far side in order to learn from the unknown. Earlier in this 
paper, the internationalization process was framed as a reflexive 
relationship influenced and enacted by both international and local actors. 
By acting through the Geographer and the Explorer I tried to give a brief 
illustration of how reality is constructed in the interface between theory 
and methods, between interviewer and informant in the research setting, 
and also between the participating actors in the internationalization 
process. To discuss these issues through metaphorical characters like the 
Geographer and the Explorer, and, on top of this, construct an interview 
is of course a rather unorthodox solution. However, considering the 
methodological issues being discussed and the messy approach advocated 
I found this solution appropriate. 
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Article 2: 
The far side of international business: local initiatives in 
the global workshop 
 
 
Introduction 
One ingredient in the intricate cocktail called globalization is the process 
of firms’ increasing involvement in international operations. This process, 
termed internationalization (Welch and Luostarinen, 1988, 36), has 
received substantial attention in international business (IB) research for 
decades. Research on the internationalization process of firms has 
primarily focused on why, how and where firms develop outward 
international operations. This development is typically explained by the 
firm’s accumulation of new knowledge and making sense of an unknown 
and unfamiliar situation (Blomstermo, Eriksson and Sharma, 2004, 242). 
Several studies have been conducted on how information and knowledge 
are transferred between strategic partners across borders (Yan and Gray, 
1994; Lane, Salk and Lyles, 2001; Zhou and Xin, 2003; Buckley, Clegg 
and Tan, 2004), but less research has addressed the analysis of 
unintended transfers of information and knowledge across borders, how 
international presence may contribute to transform host milieu actors and 
how this eventually may have a reflexive effect on the international 
company.  
This article is part of a project that studies the internationalization process 
as an interactive relationship between a company entering new markets 
and production systems and the local actors (i.e. competitors, customers, 
suppliers and employees). The article explores how host milieu actors 
participate in the internationalization process by examining the 
relationship between two Norwegian companies producing lifeboats in 
China and their local competitors. Based on the assumption that 
internationalization should be seen as a mutual and reflexive learning 
process, the questions explored are: 1) How do local companies evaluate 
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the presence of international competitors in the local production system? 
2) How is information and knowledge transferred between competitors as 
a result of this presence? and 3) How do international presence and 
knowledge transfers affect the evolution of the industry and the relative 
competitiveness of the participants?  
In the next section, I briefly review existing theories regarding the 
internationalization process of the firm, identifying shortcomings 
regarding local learning processes and initiatives. I then draw upon 
cluster theory in an attempt to overcome some of these shortcomings by 
adding a local perspective. In the third section, I explain the 
methodological approach. The fourth section, On top of the world – but 
not on top of China, discusses two case studies of Norwegian 
shipbuilding companies and their relations with the local actors. I discuss 
how local and international actors play on different competitive strengths 
and attitudes and how knowledge and information is transferred as a 
result of their interaction. In the fifth concluding section I sum up the 
main results and suggest a theoretical model to bridge the gap between 
the outward oriented approaches used by international business scholars 
and the inward oriented research conducted by those concerned with 
clusters and local production systems.  
 
Merging perspectives 
Research on industrial transformation today is separated in (at least) two 
different camps (Malmberg, 2003) and these need to be reconciled. 
Students of IB focus on how globally-organized companies develop their 
strategies, tap into, integrate and disseminate various bodies of 
knowledge and restructure their activities at a global scale. In the other 
camp, research focuses on regionally-defined systems of firms and other 
institutional actors and how interactions and spill-over among these 
create innovation, competitiveness and prosperity. To understand the 
dynamics between international and local companies, the evolution of an 
industry and the relative competitiveness of the participants, this article 
attempts to integrate insights from these two theoretical camps and 
include a perspective from the far side to study the dynamics of 
international business and local development on a practical level. 
 
The far side of international business 
 65
The internationalization approach 
To explain the internationalization process, Johanson and Wiedersheim-
Paul (1975) proposed a stepwise establishment chain, where the firm 
gradually increases its degree of commitment in foreign countries as it 
incrementally accumulates international experience. In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, a wide range of different stage models suggested that the 
internationalization process should be seen as a stepwise development 
driven by the interplay between market commitment, market knowledge 
and decisions (see for instance Andersen, 1993 or Leonidou and 
Katsikeas, 1996 for a review of some of these models). Even though the 
stage models in later work have been criticized for being too 
deterministic (Melin, 1992; Bell, Crick and Young, 2004), the 
understanding that learning is a crucial aspect in the development of 
operations abroad has endured. Business researchers have for decades 
been inviting managers of multinational corporations (MNCs) to consider 
the motivations underlying their foreign activities, what kind of 
challenges they meet in foreign economies and how they (and their 
organizations) learn and cope with these challenges (e.g. Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977; Bell et al., 2004; Blomstermo et al., 2004; Carlsson, 
Nordegren and Sjöholm, 2005).  
This research has provided valuable insight about the strategies and 
development of international companies, but tends to be overly focused 
on the intrinsic characteristics and strategies of the actors going 
international. Glückler (2006) describes the existing internationalization 
theories as ‘atomistic’ because they treat the internationalizing firm and 
its selection of markets and organizational forms of entry exclusively on 
the basis of internal characteristics and general market characteristics, 
disconnected from its institutional and relational context. Glückler 
advocates a revitalized version of the network approach to 
internationalization (see Johanson and Mattsson, 1988; Coviello and 
Munro, 1997; Hadley and Wilson, 2003) and argues that the company’s 
relations prior to the actual entry are important explanatory variables to 
understand the motivation and capacity to internationalize. 
But if internationalization is to be understood as more than merely the 
entry of firms into new markets and production systems, it is equally 
important to take into account the effects of new relations created as 
internationalization proceeds. The vast majority of the literature within IB 
and the internationalization process focuses solely on the activities of 
international actors. Considerably less effort has been made to improve 
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our understanding of how the local actors learn and act in a situation 
involving an influx of foreign capital, technology, competition, people 
and information (Welch and Luostarinen, 1993; Holm, Malmberg and 
Sölvell, 2003; Karlsen, Silseth, Benito and Welch, 2003; Hitt, Li and 
Worthington, 2005; Coe and Wrigley, 2007). The entry of foreign firms 
from developed markets not only imposes pressures on local firms to 
learn, but also provides opportunities for them to acquire the needed 
knowledge stocks (Hitt et al., 2005). Karlsen et al. (2003) argue that 
inward activities, which provide an opportunity to build relations with 
foreign actors and to learn about the ‘nuts and bolts’ of foreign activities, 
may form an important platform for subsequent outward operations. This 
is supported by Child and Rodrigues (2005) who note that some Chinese 
firms have internationalized via close, continuing, operational and 
organizational relationships with one or more MNCs in order to gain 
competencies and knowledge relevant to eventual ‘outward’ 
internationalization. Most foreign companies entering China make efforts 
to learn about and adapt to this new, dynamic environment. But, at the 
same time, they are a source of input and further transformation for 
Chinese corporations who are eager to learn the rules of the market from 
the organizations that provide the best lessons for a successful transition 
to a market economy (Guthrie, 2005). This strategy has for nearly three 
decades enabled some Chinese firms to acquire knowledge of extensive 
competitive value (Child and Rodrigues, 2005).  
 
Local characteristics: lessons from the cluster approach 
To analyze the dynamics of localized industrial systems, scholars 
frequently apply the cluster concept. Porter (2000, 16) defines a cluster as 
a geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and 
associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and 
complementarities. Clusters are typically analyzed along two lines: a 
vertical dimension including firms linked to each other by input and 
output relations in the same value chain and a horizontal dimension 
encompassing firms producing similar products. Although these two 
dimensions have been studied and debated the most, there may be other 
dimensions that contribute to the evolution of regional clusters and the 
creation and distribution of knowledge within clusters. Bathelt (2005b) 
suggests a five dimensional framework that adds institutional, power and 
external dimensions. The institutional dimension refers to a set of 
particular norms, rules, shared habits and conventions that are the result 
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of ongoing social relations (Bathelt, 2005a). The institutional context of 
the cluster defines how things are done within it and how learning 
transpires (Wolfe and Gertler, 2004). The dynamics of unequal 
relationships and different actors’ capacities to make the clusters 
strengths, characteristics and other actors work to their own advantage 
constitute the power dimension. The power of a certain actor in a cluster 
may depend on the actor’s relationships and reputation within and outside 
the cluster, financial strengths, innovativeness and absorptive capacity, i.e. 
the ability to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate 
it, and apply it to commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). As most 
studies tend to focus on well-functioning clusters in particular regions, 
there is a tendency to under-conceptualize issues of power and culture in 
cluster-studies (Depner and Bathelt, 2005). In these harmonious clusters, 
efficient communication processes enable reproduction within a uniform 
cultural and institutional environment. This environment, however, may 
be introverted and hard to break into for entering firms. In addition, deep-
rooted industrial environments, although effective for a while, may lead 
to path dependency, inertia and a collective decline in absorptive capacity 
(Malmberg, 2003; Lindsay, 2005; Maskell and Malmberg, 2007). Both 
individual firms and clusters need access to both local buzz and global 
pipelines in order to be successful (Bathelt, Malmberg and Maskell, 2004; 
Wolfe and Gertler, 2004). Buzz is a concept referring to the basic, yet 
highly efficient, communication technology of face-to-face contact, 
which is a means of overcoming coordination and incentive problems in 
uncertain environments; a key to socialization and in-group membership; 
and a direct source of psychological motivation (Storper and Venables, 
2004). Accordingly, local buzz is about ‘the information ecology’ of the 
cluster, an ecology consisting of specific information and continuous 
updates, intended and unintended learning processes in both organized 
and accidental meetings, and the mutual understanding of new knowledge 
and technologies (Bathelt, 2005a). Whereas local interaction and 
participation in local buzz often happen by chance in the course of daily 
activities, participation in global circuits is usually a result of more 
devoted and targeted activities (Malmberg, 2003). Global pipelines refer 
to the linkages clusters establish to external environments, for instance by 
dealing with suppliers, customers and competitors outside the local 
environment. This external dimension has been especially neglected in 
many studies of the success and growth of clusters. Although it has been 
acknowledged that external inputs are important triggers to stimulate 
growth within a cluster, little systematic analysis deals with the outcome 
of a cluster’s insertion into global value chains and what happens when 
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companies from abroad internationalize and set up within clusters 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; 2004; Bathelt et al., 2004; Bathelt, 2005a).  
Even though research on the relationship and dynamics between foreign 
entrants and the local milieus in which these entrants set up is limited, it 
is not an entirely blank page. Coe and Wrigley (2007) propose a model, 
grounded in a relational perspective, which shows how retail 
transnational corporations (TNCs) in emerging market are necessarily 
embedded in webs of intra-, inter- and extra-firm network relationships. 
This approach acknowledge that these network relationships are 
simultaneously shaped by the institutional/regulatory/cultural context of 
both the home economies of the retail TNCs and also of the host 
economies/societies those firm enter in the merging market. Furthermore 
it is recognized that neither the TNC nor the host economy/society are 
static entities, but mutually contributing to transform each other in an 
ongoing process of learning and adaptation. Holm et al.(2003) show how 
the dynamics of the host country influence the development of foreign 
owned subsidiaries and points out that the local counterparts may, as well, 
develop new competencies – from having business contact with the given 
MNC’s subsidiaries (ibid, 390). However, there is still little empirical 
research on the far side of international business. Coe and Wrigley’s 
contribution is largely theoretical, while Holm et al. derive their empirical 
data from the managers of the foreign owned subsidiaries.  
 
Studying the far side – the methodological approach 
A ‘relational turn’ has recently been identified in economic geography 
(Boggs and Rantisi, 2003). This is a paradigmatic shift towards an 
increased focus on economic action and interaction, rather than 
geographically dispersed economic structures (Bathelt and Gluckler, 
2003). According to Yeung (2005, 38), actors are not static ‘things’ fixed 
in time and space; they are dynamic and evolving so that their differential 
practices unleash multiple forms of emergent power in relational 
geometries. This approach to economic geography resonates well with 
actor-network theory, which underlines that it is the traces of human 
actions, not the whole actor, that are important (Yearly, 2005).  
To investigate the relationship between foreign entrants and the host 
environments in which they set up, this study explore the entry and 
presence of two Norwegian companies in the Chinese lifeboat industry. 
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Rather than focusing on the structures, assessments and decisions of these 
two companies, the focus of this exploration is on the relationships 
between the Norwegian entrants and their Chinese competitors and the 
traces of these relationships. In this empirical endeavor, to understand the 
dynamics between international and local actors in the Chinese lifeboat 
industry, the main sources of evidence have been interviews and direct 
observations. Companies interviewed include two Norwegian-owned 
entities, one state-owned Chinese company and five privately-owned 
Chinese companies (table 1). In order to hide the true identities of the 
companies, they are renamed after bars and restaurants in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Qingdao.  
 
Table 1: Interviews conducted in lifeboat companies in China 
Company Interviewee position (Nationality) Location Date 
Le Bang (Norwegian) General manager (Norwegian) Norway February 
2005 
 Plant manager (Norwegian) Qingdao April 2005 
 Production manager (Chinese) Qingdao April 2005 
 Sales manager (Chinese) Qingdao April 2005 
 Quality control engineer (Chinese) Qingdao April 2005 
 Senior engineer (Norwegian) Qingdao April 2005 
 Secretary (Chinese) Qingdao April 2005 
 Technical manager (Chinese) Qingdao April 2005 
 Purchase manager (Chinese) Qingdao May 2006 
 External sales agent (Chinese) Shanghai March 2006 
Red Capital Boat 
Building  
General manager (Chinese) Qingdao April 2005 
 Vice-director & sales manager 
(Chinese) 
Qingdao April 2005 
Constellation General manager & owner (Chinese) Wuxi April 2005 
People 6 General manager & owner (Chinese) Jiangyin April 2005 
Tanghui Lifesaving Salesperson (Chinese) Jiangyin April 2005 
 Vice director & owner (Chinese) Jiangyin March 2006 
Madame Zung General manager & owner (Chinese) Jiangyin April 2005 
Cloud 9 (Norwegian) HR manager (Chinese) Jiangyin April 2005 
 After-sales manager (Chinese) Jiangyin April 2005 
 General manager & owner 
(Norwegian) 
Norway July 2005 
Pegasus General manager & owner (Chinese) Jiangyin April 2005 
The Norwegian company Le Bang worked as a starting point for this 
study. Based on their account of who’s who in the Chinese lifeboat 
industry, I contacted the most significant competitors. Some other 
companies in China sporadically produce lifeboats for the domestic 
market, but these companies were not seen as real competitors by the 
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informants in the eight companies interviewed and were not contacted. 
None of the managers of the eight companies refused to be interviewed, 
but some were reluctant at first. The order of the table above is based on 
the date I first conducted an interview in the company. In addition to the 
companies in the table, one company involved in the history is now 
defunct and was renamed ‘Cotton Club’.  
The interviews listed in the table were scheduled, semi-structured in-
depth interviews that typically lasted between one and two hours. A 
Chinese assistant aided in conducting and transcribing most of the 
interviews. The interviews covered a range of issues, including the 
company’s history, products, markets and employees. Interviewees were 
invited to discuss the keys to success in the lifeboat business, future 
prospects, imitation issues, knowledge transfers, international ambitions, 
recruitment strategies and their relationship to other companies in the 
industry. Sometimes this relationship was best revealed by asking the 
informant questions about the characteristics of the other companies and 
the people working there. According to Fang (1999), who has conducted 
research on Chinese business negotiating style, it is often a productive 
approach to talk about the others, rather than asking the informants 
directly about their own character and strategies. Besides the interviews, I 
was given a tour of each company’s production facilities, usually with 
permission to take photos and sometimes to conduct short field interviews 
with other employees of the company. I had lunch with managers and 
employees from several companies which provided a chance to listen, 
observe and discuss in a more informal setting. I also attended activities 
where I met some of the companies’ representatives, for instance 
‘Marintec China 2005’, which was an exposition gathering thousands of 
shipping and ship building industry participants from China and abroad.  
 
Challenges on the far side 
In traditional business research, one does often have access to a large 
number of quite homogenous informants, and based on their information 
the researcher may be able to produce some generalizations. The number 
of informants interviewed for this study, on the other hand, is rather 
limited and the information they provide is sometimes contradictory. The 
main reason explaining the sum of informants is simply that the lifeboat 
industry in China contains a limited number of actors, and I was usually 
not permitted to meet other informants than the top management in the 
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Chinese firms. In those cases where I actually did speak to other 
employees, these employees usually referred to the general manager if the 
questions went slightly off the track. Le Bang was an exception. I took 
part in meetings and other daily activities in this company over a three 
week period and I also came back a year later and had some very 
interesting interviews and discussions with employees in various levels of 
the organization.  
To establish trust and get access to information and opinions is always a 
challenge when conducting research in a business environment, and 
perhaps even more so when studying a competitive environment from 
different angles. By moving between competitors, the researcher may 
loose some advantages and qualities – such as consensus and access to 
informants beyond the general manager or to strategic and sensitive 
information that perhaps is more willingly revealed to a more steadfast 
researcher. But some insight is also won on the far side, such as different 
perspectives and the opportunity to scrutinize relationships between 
actors. 
As part of this walkabout in the competitive landscape of China’s lifeboat 
industry, stories emerged that could be utilized in later interviews to 
trigger other informants’ accounts of what happened and thereby reveal 
what otherwise would have been untold. Needless to say, informants 
articulated some events quite differently depending on the position of the 
informant. To synthesize the different perspectives and opinions 
expressed by actors in different camps and reconstruct a unison version of 
what in fact did happen is sometimes a challenge, other times downright 
impossible or unethical. Grounded in a relational perspective I consider 
the varying opinions and stories as traces of a business reality that is in 
fact depending on the perspective of the observer (see also Hansen, 2008).  
 
On top of the world – but not on top of China 
When companies from developed countries established themselves in 
China in the 1980s and 1990s, it was a proactive step to seek an unspoiled 
market and low-cost production opportunities – China was seen as a great 
opportunity. When companies now enter China, it is because China 
appears to be the only opportunity. According to the GM of Le Bang,  
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The question is not if we by staying in Norway can compete with China – 
which we can’t. The question is whether we can compete with China in 
China.  
The majority of Chinese lifeboats are built in two locations: the city of 
Qingdao and in the small town of Jiangyin, west of Shanghai. Cloud 9 
established in Jiangyin in 1998, while Le Bang (re-)established in 
Qingdao in 2004. The Chinese affiliates of both companies are led by 
Norwegian managers, and both companies still have headquarters, R&D 
and production plants in Norway (see figure 1). The numbers in 
parentheses indicate the approximate number of boats produced in 2004, 
based on the managers’ own statements, and to a certain degree 
confirmed by the other local managers. The figures for the two 
Norwegian companies count only boats built in China; production in 
Norway and elsewhere is not included. It should be noted that the figure 
below is only a sketch of the lifeboat industry in China – it paints a 
simplified picture and some of the numbers, connections and events 
illustrated here are disputed by the companies.  
 
 
Figure 1: Lifeboat companies in China 
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Qingdao: a Norwegian comeback to China 
In 2004, the Norwegian lifeboat company Le Bang established an affiliate 
in China. High production costs at home and the long distance to the 
growing markets in East-Asia encouraged the company to move some 
production capacity to Qingdao. At that time, there were already two 
lifeboat companies in Qingdao: the big state-owned producer Red Capital 
Boatbuilding, which is a branch of a large ship repair and construction 
company, and a small, outdated company, ‘Cotton Club’, established as a 
spin-off by former Red Capital employees in 1999 (figure 1) and owned 
by a major Chinese player in global shipping and ship building industry. 
According to several Chinese informants, the only reason Cotton Club 
was able to keep its head above the water was sales to customers within 
the parent company. Le Bang considered three different alternatives when 
they decided to establish in China: greenfield, i.e. to build a new factory 
from scratch, joint venture (JV) with a Chinese company or acquisition of 
an existing lifeboat company (see Child and Rodrigues, 2005 for an 
overview of pros and cons of different routes toward internationalization). 
Due to high investment costs in the case of greenfield, and some bad 
experiences with JVs, they chose the latter alternative and bought Cotton 
Club.  
This acquisition was not the first time Le Bang established activity in 
Qingdao. In 1982 they had initiated cooperation with Red Capital. At that 
time, Le Bang did not invest significantly in China. It was supposed to be 
the beginning of a long-term cooperation in which Red Capital, aided by 
Le Bang’s technology and design, produced boats for both companies’ 
benefit. This is a typical example of cooperation between international 
and Chinese actors in which MNCs form JVs primarily to penetrate local 
markets and pursue financial goals, while the local partner gets to learn 
more advanced Western technology (Yan and Gray, 1994). The 
partnership went along well for a few years, but in 1986 Le Bang went 
bankrupt. According to Norwegian informants, the Chinese venture 
somehow vanished from Le Bang’s asset portfolio that was purchased by 
a bigger Norwegian company. The current GM of Le Bang states,  
Red Capital just kept the whole joint, including our brand name! 
Another Norwegian in Le Bang said that,  
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The new owner of Le Bang decided that the China venture was of no 
interest. 
Informants in Red Capital, on the other hand, assert that the cooperation 
actually continued as usual until 1989, when the Tiananmen incident 
resulted in a change of policy towards China that forced the Norwegian 
company to withdraw. 
Nevertheless, the boats, designs and technology that immigrated to China 
in the early 1980s left their mark. Red Capital, and other Chinese 
companies, continued to build lifeboats on their own and became 
important suppliers of maritime lifesaving equipment for the domestic 
shipyards and as well as Japan, South Korea and Singapore. As the GM 
of Le Bang sardonically put it:  
It seems like the whole lifeboat industry in China is based on our MCB-
24.1  
Table 2 summarizes some of the opinions the managers of the two 
companies in Qingdao expressed when asked about their view on their 
own company’s future prospects and their relationship to other companies 
in the lifeboat industry.  
Table 2: The relationship between local and foreign lifeboat firms in Qingdao  
Company 
 
Red Capital Boatbuilding Le Bang (Qingdao) 
Owner 
 
Chinese, state owned Norwegian, private  
Future prospects 
 
Optimistic Optimistic 
Attitude towards new 
competitor 
Slightly positive. International 
presence improves technology 
and local reputation; They’re no 
threat. 
Negative. “Red Capital is curious 
about us and has many sources of 
information inside this plant” 
Attitude towards new 
competitor’s chance of 
success 
“They don't understand China; 
they’re too concerned with 
quality, and they won’t find good 
personnel”  
“Several brand-less, Chinese 
companies produce low quality 
and will probably disappear soon; 
Red Capital has made many 
foolish investments” 
Attitude toward 
cooperation with other local 
producers 
“We have many friends in Le 
Bang; we visit each other, but we 
don't cooperate” 
The Chinese employees assert that 
they sometimes cooperate and 
share info with Red Capital. 
                                                 
1 The enclosed lifeboat Le Bang brought into the cooperation with Red Capital in the 
early 1980s. 
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Jiangyin: joint ventures and divorces 
While Le Bang and Red Capital are located far from each other on 
opposite ends of the big city of Qingdao, Jiangyin is a classic cluster with 
several ship building companies and their suppliers. Most of the 
companies began operations by supplying the small-scale, and less 
demanding, shipbuilders along the Yangtze River. Later, some companies 
matured and started supplying the large and more quality oriented 
shipyards in Shanghai and Guangzhou or exported to South Korea and 
Japan. Jiangyin is home of China’s oldest and largest lifeboat producer 
Tanghui, often called ‘the mother of Chinese lifeboat industry’ because of 
the company’s relationships to later establishments in the industry. With 
the exception of Constellation, which is located in the nearby city Wuxi, 
five companies are located within a very short radius in Jiangyin. 
Following Le Bang’s bankruptcy in 1986, a new Norwegian lifeboat 
company, Cloud 9, emerged in 1988 (see figure 1). Cloud 9 was started 
by the heir of the entrepreneur who founded Le Bang in 1945. In 1998, 
together with a Singaporean company, Cloud 9 set up a JV with the 
Chinese company Madame Zung in Jiangyin. As part of the agreement, 
Cloud 9 chipped in two boat models, the company from Singapore 
brought the same value in money, and Madame Zung provided the 
production facilities, workers and local expertise. But cooperation soon 
became difficult. The owners could never agree on a common goal and 
soon began to blame each other for not fulfilling the agreement. 
According to one involved party, 
This was not a happy joint venture! 
First, the sales manager left the JV in October 2000 to start People 6, and 
in 2001, Cloud 9 and their Singaporean partner divorced themselves from 
Madame Zung. According to the managers of Madame Zung and People 
6, the foreign companies drained resources from Madame Zung before 
leaving. Others claim that the reason of this divorce was the opportunistic 
behavior of the Chinese partner. Nevertheless, the JV was dissolved and 
Cloud 9 set up their own operation on the same street. A former Madame 
Zung-employee was given 20 percent of the new venture to act as a 
partner and GM of the new Cloud 9. But in July 2002, this partnership 
also ended. According to a Norwegian informant, this happened because 
the local partner established a company of his own, Pegasus, next door to 
Cloud 9. The local partner, however, claims he never actually received 
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the 20 percent company share he was entitled to and that he was locked in 
a room for six hours and forced to accept a settlement that released him 
from all ownership and positions in Cloud 9. Pegasus was, according to 
him, established after he was thrown out of Cloud 9. In 2004 Cloud 9 
sued their former GM for stealing blueprints and copying Cloud 9’s 
design. The defendant claims that he, while working at Madame Zung 
and Cloud 9, is the one who designed these boats anyway, and that Cloud 
9, if anyone, is the one stealing technology:  
They argue that the shape is similar, but we are talking about lifeboats… 
they all look more or less the same! Just as a car has four wheels, a 
lifeboat has a certain shape!  
Some of the attitudes the international and local companies in Jiangyin 
express about each other and how they consider their own future 
prospects are recapitulated in table 3.  
 
Table 3: The relationship between local and foreign lifeboat firms in Jiangyin 
Company 
 
Constellation 
(Wuxi) 
Tanghui People 6 Madame 
Zung 
Pegasus Jiangyin 
Cloud 9 
Ownership Private 
Chinese 
Private 
Chinese 
Private 
Chinese 
Private 
Chinese 
Private 
Chinese 
Private 
Norwegian 
Future  
prospects 
Pessimistic Optimistic Slightly 
pessimistic
Neutral Optimistic Optimistic 
Attitude 
towards 
other side  
Negative. 
“Foreign 
entrants are 
unfair and 
create 
turbulence” 
Slightly 
positive. 
“They’re ok, 
we can learn 
about 
management 
models and 
technology, 
but they 
abuse the 
tax system” 
Positive 
and 
negative. 
“Improves 
technology 
and 
quality 
routines, 
but they 
create 
local 
friction” 
Negative. 
“Foreign 
companies 
exploit 
local 
companies 
and create 
turbulence”
Negative.  
“They 
always 
make China 
look bad 
and they 
exploit local 
companies” 
Negative 
“The 
business 
environment 
is harsh. 
The locals 
copy our 
technology 
and 
routines” 
Attitude 
towards 
other side’s 
chance of 
success 
“They won’t 
sell much in 
China; Le 
Bang made a 
bad deal 
when they 
bought 
Cotton Club” 
“They have 
high costs, 
and they 
don't know 
much about 
the Asian 
market” 
 “Their 
quality is 
not that 
good and 
their 
prices are 
too high” 
“They are 
too 
expensive 
and unable 
to compete 
for Chinese 
customers” 
“Norwegian 
management 
is not good. 
They 
depend on 
good, local 
personnel” 
“They’ll not 
be able to 
compete 
abroad; they 
lack sales 
and service 
network and 
reputation” 
Attitude “For Chinese “It’s “We’re “We’re “I know “We don't 
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toward 
cooperation 
with other 
local 
producers 
people it is 
hard to 
cooperate; I 
know the 
others, but 
we’re not 
really 
friends” 
important 
that all local 
companies 
make good 
quality. We 
try to help 
the others”  
friends 
and rivals; 
we eat and 
drink 
together, 
but we 
don't talk 
about 
business” 
friends, but 
we don't do 
business 
together” 
people in 
the other 
companies, 
but we’re 
not 
friendly” 
cooperate 
on R&D, 
but 
sometimes 
we borrow 
equipment 
from 
Tanghui” 
 
Different attitudes and sources of inspiration 
The horizontal linkages in a cluster can be analyzed in terms of 
cooperation and competition for customers, employees, supplies, 
technologies and designs. A company’s ability to maneuver in the 
business environment is dependent on its competitive advantages such as 
delivering the goods at lower cost than competitors (cost advantage) or by 
delivering products that exceed other products (differentiation advantage). 
These advantages come from the firm’s innovativeness, efficiency, and 
customer responsiveness, which again are shaped by the company’s 
resources and capabilities to utilize its resources effectively (Porter, 1998). 
The competitive advantages of Norwegian and Chinese lifeboat producers 
are at the outset distinctly different, but this picture changes as co-
location conveys new resources to both sides, which the respective 
companies may capitalize on if they have the resources, capability and 
motivation to change. The Norwegian companies spend substantial 
efforts on a worldwide service network, quality control, design quality 
and technological development. They primarily target cruise and offshore 
customers which are considerably less price sensitive than the merchant 
marine ships. The Chinese producers spend less on service, design and 
development; they have significantly lower management and production 
costs and thus lower prices, also compared to the Norwegian affiliates in 
China. A manager in Red Capital remarked, 
The Norwegian lifeboat companies are on top of the world, but they are 
not on top of China.  
Although Le Bang and Cloud 9 are world-leading companies in many 
respects, their Chinese competitors do not admit to worrying about their 
own positions in the local industrial system and East Asian market for 
lifeboats. One common explanation offered by Chinese managers is that 
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the Norwegian companies don't understand China and the East Asian 
market. Another reason emphasized by the managers of the leading 
Chinese companies, Red Capital and Tanghui, is that international 
customers become aware of the Chinese producers when the more famous 
Norwegian companies establish nearby. But the most important reason 
has to do with the opportunity to gain knowledge from the entrants.  
China has a reputation as a notorious violator of intellectual property 
rights (IPR). According to Alford (1995), the Chinese attitude towards 
IPR and copying can be traced back to Confucius who 2500 years ago 
declared ‘I transmit, rather than create’. Transmitting the best known 
solution rather than striving to create new solutions is an attitude that 
seems to prevail in the Chinese lifeboat industry. The Chinese managers 
openly admit that they study the products and routines of other companies 
and bring engineers to expos to examine other boats. The manager of 
Tanghui asserts that they once bought, deconstructed and analyzed a boat 
from Japan to learn how to replicate similar quality. However, this is not, 
with a few exceptions, illegal activity because lifeboat models and details 
are rarely protected by patents. Rather this is evidence of a pragmatic 
attitude to utilize the resources available to learn and improve products 
and production processes. The Norwegian managers, in contrast, 
emphasize the importance of being technological leaders and do not 
acknowledge that other lifeboat producers are a significant source of 
inspiration. Similar attitudes are also conveyed in the managers’ 
understandings of the concept ‘quality’: the Norwegians emphasize that 
quality can never be good enough; Chinese informants, on the other hand, 
assert that the best quality is the quality that is just good enough. 
Chinese lifeboat companies have developed from being quite primitive 
imitators in the late 1970s to become producers that deliver good quality 
standard lifeboats for a reasonable price in the 2000s. This development, 
perhaps inspired by the MCB-24 Le Bang brought to China in the early 
1980s, has been largely based on a gradual internal learning process 
where the Chinese companies have imitated other boats on the market, 
sometimes with adjustments requested by their customers. Today, the 
Chinese lifeboat companies are eager to learn more, but in contrast to the 
previous phase of industrial upgrading where the product was the main 
source of inspiration, they do now want to learn about production 
processes, management practices, quality control, after-sales service and 
the global market. This kind of knowledge, which is often tacit rather 
than codified, cannot be extracted from the product alone, but may be 
within reach when companies possessing these qualities enter and 
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establish activity in the vicinity (Guthrie, 2005). Knowledge of this nature 
is transmitted most effectively through interpersonal contacts and inter-
firm mobility of skilled workers (Wolfe and Gertler, 2004).  
 
People and technology travel together 
Even though some of the managers of both the Chinese and Norwegian 
firms claim that they prefer not to mingle with people from the other 
companies (table 3), the Chinese lifeboat industry is knit together in a 
tight network of deliberate and accidental flows of people, information 
and technology. There are people in all lifeboat companies that nurture 
close relationships with employees of the other companies (tables 2 and 
3). This information ecology created by face-to-face contacts, co-
presence and co-location of people and firms within the same industry, 
place or region, is what Bathelt et al. (2004) refer to as local buzz. Access 
to premium quality local buzz, however, is not equally distributed 
between the participants within a cluster (Depner and Bathelt, 2005). The 
ability to extract knowledge, information and rumors from the local 
environment depends on the actor’s absorptive capacity. While some of 
the local companies (especially Tanghui, which is increasing its market 
share both in China and abroad) seem to benefit from the presence of 
international actors, other local firms can not absorb the resources 
entering the local buzz, and expect to be swallowed or pushed out of 
business by one of the advancing companies (table 3). The Norwegian 
affiliates and managers have limited capacity to absorb information and 
knowledge from the environment due to limited language skills, limited 
knowledge of the local industry and unestablished reputation and 
relations. But they may still be contributors and recipients in the local 
communication ecology through other employees. Relationships make it 
easy to turn know-who into know-how in China (Hsu and Saxenian, 
2000). 
As China left the ‘iron rice-bowl’2 behind and started moving towards a 
market economy, voluntary job-change has become common and has 
increased competition for skilled and semi-skilled labor (Nee and Cao, 
2005). The lifeboat industry is no exception; skilled engineers and good 
                                                 
2 A concept referring to a system providing job security, as well as modest, but steady 
income and benefits, especially common for workers in the state-owned enterprises.  
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key personnel are a crucial competitive advantage. Sales personnel are 
particularly valued due to their personal relationships with customers and 
production and quality managers for their knowledge of design and 
technology. As the GM of Red Capital put it, 
People and technology travel together; the boats are in the workers’ 
minds and can be built anywhere.  
When key personnel switch jobs, they bring knowledge and business 
relationships to their new employers, but such switches may also 
establish links that facilitate transfers of information and knowledge back 
to their former employers. Grabner and Ibert (2006) assert that personal 
networks engender lasting and latent ties in the background of the 
manifest and temporary ‘plumbing’ of organizational relations. The 
Chinese managers confirm that engineers, especially in Jiangyin, go in 
and out of different companies, but they do not see this as principally a 
problem,  
I think it is good if everybody spies a little bit on each other because it 
improves production (Sales manager, Red Capital). 
  
We study Cloud 9’s routines for quality control and learn from them 
(GM, People 6).  
Some of the Chinese managers describe Cloud 9 as a training camp where 
engineers stay for a while, then return to the locally owned companies 
with their knowledge:  
If Cloud 9 develops a new boat everyone in Jiangyin will produce it by 
the end of the day (GM, Red Capital).  
That there is a brain drain from Cloud 9 to the Chinese companies is 
moderately rejected by the GM of Cloud 9, but he admits that information 
and technology frequently is transferred via their employees to competing 
companies, 
 Some of our engineers seize the opportunity to sell blueprints and 
information to our competitors to earn some extra money. It is important 
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to deal with this, but it is also important not to become too paranoid, 
because that is not good for the company either.  
As a result of their concern about leaks and opportunism, firms are likely 
to guard their core competencies and any capabilities that represent a 
source for their competitive advantage, but this kind of protectionism can 
also become a barrier that may obstruct learning and development (Hitt et 
al., 2005). At one point, Cloud 9 was so concerned about unauthorized 
knowledge transfers that several good employees were fired or quit by 
themselves.  
Le Bang in Qingdao is faced with similar, although more congenial, 
attitudes from their local competitor. Due to the relationships between 
employees of Le Bang and Red Capital, the manager of Le Bang stresses 
that they have to be very cautious with strategic information within the 
firm. One time, Red Capital actually conducted a covert information 
gathering operation. During a customer site visit at Le Bang, one person 
was asking a lot of odd and detailed questions, but he never properly 
introduced himself and claimed to have forgotten his name cards. Later, 
he admitted that he worked for Red Capital. He took the opportunity to 
invite the GM of Le Bang to an official visit of Red Capital’s site. As the 
GM of Red Capital put it in a humorous tone,  
It is good for us that Le Bang came to Qingdao, because now we can get 
training for our workers as well.  
Le Bang has so far delayed moving production of more advanced boats to 
China. According to the Norwegian management the main reason is that 
they need to upgrade the plant and the workforce before taking this step, 
but their local executives as well as the competitors claim that the actual 
reason is the threat of making the technology, design and production 
process of advanced freefall and off-shore boats more available to local 
companies.  
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Conclusion – Toward a reflexive theory of international 
business 
Whereas cluster studies can be criticized for evading the external 
dimension, research on the internationalization process can be criticized 
for failing to acknowledge the local dynamics of the host milieu in which 
international activity is established. Economic systems are reflexive: the 
actors concerned explicitly question the organization and, based on their 
understanding, try to conceive and establish new rules for the game 
(Callon, Meadel and Rabeharisoa, 2005). When companies enter distant 
markets, they are not moving into a static configuration, simply adding 
another input or output source to their value chain – they are entering a 
dynamic system consisting of other actors who also learn, evaluate and 
act in the situation. Therefore, a new approach to understand the 
internationalization process and the dynamics of the international and 
local actors might be to turn the concept of foreignness around and focus 
on how the host-country actors understand the international actors as 
foreigners, and how both sides learn, adapt to and transform each other. 
Based on theoretical contributions from IB studies, economic geography 
and the case studies in the Chinese lifeboat industry, I suggest a model 
(Figure 2) to analyze how international and local actors learn and 
participate in the development of each other. Instead of using the term 
‘cluster’ in the model, I employ the concept of ‘host milieu’. The reason 
is that this is not primarily a model about clusters, but the interaction and 
knowledge transfers between international and local actors. In my case 
study, the ‘local actors’ were competing companies, but the model could 
also be applied to the interaction between the international firm and local 
policy makers, employees, suppliers, customers, etc.  
 
Figure 2: The interactive relationship between international and local actors 
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The model is set in motion when the internationalizing actor (I-actor) 
starts exploring opportunities and barriers for business in another country 
or milieu. This (initial) initiative may be triggered by the I-actors existing 
relations to other companies (relational entry), or it can be set off by the 
I-actors market or resource seeking strategies (atomistic entry) (Glückler, 
2006). To initiate this exploration process, the I-actor will, depending on 
its absorptive capacity, draw on accessible resources including former 
experience and relationships with other companies, academic and popular 
literature and chambers of commerce. These information resources are 
referred in the model as a ‘knowledge pool’. Some of the resources in this 
pool may be explicit knowledge put down on paper and easily shared, 
while other resources may be tacit, i.e. technical or cognitive knowledge 
made up of mental models, values, insights and assumptions which are 
not expressed verbally (Smith, 2001). The I-actor will then evaluate its 
capacities and qualifications (the internal barriers) in accordance with 
the perceived external barriers in the host milieu. These are formal 
barriers such as tariff-barriers and informal barriers, which may include 
the actions of competitors and partners, consumer preferences, language, 
and differences in culture, business practices, and industrial development. 
These barriers can all serve to complicate the firm’s production and 
transactions, impeding the flow of information and thereby limiting the 
external firm’s capability to learn, understand and predict the dynamics of 
the host milieu. The informal barriers are similar to Johanson and 
Vahlne’s (1977) concept psychic distance – the sum of factors preventing 
the flow of information to and from the market. If the I-actor decides that 
it will be able to draw advantage from and cope with the characteristics of 
the host milieu, the company may launch an initiative to access the 
identified business opportunities. 
After the I-actor has entered the host milieu, it may gradually increase its 
capability to understand the new environment. This is illustrated in the 
model as ‘knowledge and information about the host milieu’ flowing (or 
sometimes leaking) from the host milieu to the knowledge pool. The 
model so far is very much in line with general theories about the 
internationalization process of the firm. But the model differs by 
considering that the I-actor’s presence creates a global pipeline to the host 
milieu that contributes to fill the locals’ knowledge pool. Inward 
internationalization may stimulate processes of localized learning (see 
Maskell and Malmberg, 1999) as it provides local actors with an 
opportunity to have international knowledge, experience and attention 
delivered at home. The impact and influence of the international initiative 
may via a ‘process of localized learning’ alter the horizontal and vertical 
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linkages of the cluster and hence the relative power between its actors. In 
the case of Chinese lifeboat companies, the local companies can 
manufacture and sell standard lifeboats for a low price, but they rely on 
inputs from external sources to upgrade their routines and technologies. 
This knowledge is to some extent unintentionally transferred from the 
Norwegian companies to their local competitors via labor mobility 
between the companies and employees ongoing relationships with former 
colleagues. But it is also transferred as a result of direct observation of 
products and practices and, in some special cases, undercover work and 
more illegitimate methods.  
The knowledge transfer may also spur new local initiatives, i.e. 
technological innovations, imitations, production processes, exports or 
imports. In my cases, the Chinese producers believe that the Norwegian 
lifeboat companies increase competition, turbulence and mutual distrust, 
but the foreigners are also seen as gateway to external resources. The 
entry of Norwegian firms in the Chinese lifeboat production system 
seems to have an equalizing effect on the evolution of the companies in 
the industry: the entrants get the opportunity to produce cheaper boats 
and access price sensitive markets hitherto out of reach, whereas some of 
the local actors get more attention from the global customers and the 
opportunity to upgrade their products and routines to meet global 
standards. Whereas Norwegian and Chinese companies in the past were 
competing for different segments of the market, they are now 
increasingly meeting in the same competitive arena. These changes and 
new initiatives may again have a feedback effect on the I-actor 
(illustrated as ‘local response’). The model of the interactive relationship 
between international and local actors encompasses an ongoing dynamic 
which does not end when the international company receives response 
from the host milieu, but continues as the involved actors persist to 
evaluate and act based on their understanding of the situation.  
Even though the model of the interactive relationship between 
international and local actors (figure 2) has emerged as a result of 
research on the competitive environment in a transition economy, I would 
encourage others to take a perspective from the far side even when 
studying international business in more mature markets and production 
systems. More research on the linkages between international and local 
actors will contribute to enhance our understanding of both the 
internationalization process and local industrial development. This 
fieldwork conducted on both sides of the internationalization process 
supports two important points. First, the reality is a point of view: the 
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stories that are told and the explanations offered about events and 
relationships in international business affairs are substantially different 
depending on the position of the narrator (see also Hansen, 2008). This 
was demonstrated in the stories about why and when Le Bang pulled out 
of China after its first entry in the 1980s and the turbulence around Cloud 
9’s JV in Jiangyin. Second, the internationalization process is not, and 
should not be studied, as a one-way learning process. Internationalization 
is a reflexive and dynamic process. Local actors absorb the effects of 
incoming companies and act upon them. New initiatives, ideas and values 
regarding management, quality, and design emerge in this process, 
producing a hybrid culture and industrial structure at the doorstep where 
local and international actors meet. 
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Article 4: 
Karaoke or Corruption – Balancing Diverging 
Expectations and Demands in International Ventures 
 
 
Introduction: The Gap and the Bridge 
China is getting closer. Economic activity of all kinds, conducted by 
different actors all over the world, can more often than not be traced back 
to China in some way or other. Chinese factories and consumers have 
become important ingredients in the global economy, and vice-versa, the 
global economy has become a vital ingredient in the development of 
Chinese society. The growth of the Chinese economy has not come about 
unnoticed. Companies from all over the world are entering China’s 
market and production system to take part in this growth – already ten 
years ago described as ‘perhaps the greatest gold rush the world has ever 
seen’ (Faure, 1998). The motivation underlying Norwegian companies’ 
establishments in China are multiple. The most common explanations 
when company managers and owners are asked why they are present in 
China are access to low cost labor, cheap factor inputs, close proximity to 
important business-to-business markets and the dream of one billion 
customers.  
Running an overseas affiliate is a challenge, and China is surely no 
exception. Some managers describe an adventure come true, but many 
report harsh competition for factor inputs and market shares, high 
employee turnover rates, copying and unintentional knowledge transfers, 
poor legislative protection of foreign economic activity, and perhaps most 
importantly, problems staying informed about the challenges mentioned 
above. On top of this, the international company in China (and especially 
its manager) has to balance expectations and demands from two separate 
realities which both provide different notions of ethics, values and best 
practices.  
Encounters on the far side 
 116
In this chapter, which is not only about karaoke and corruption, the 
purpose is to look into how Norwegian managers in charge of some of the 
Norwegian-owned affiliates in China walk the line between expectations 
and demands provided by their headquarters, which are embedded in a 
Norwegian style of management (as well as jurisdiction), with the 
expectations and demands rooted in Chinese reality. This balancing act is 
discussed in two different relationships. First (The Gap Within), I take a 
look inside the international affiliate to examine how diverging 
Norwegian and Chinese standards and ideas regarding quality, human 
relations, incentive systems and distribution of responsibility within the 
company often are conflicting and thus become fundamental challenges 
for the international company, its employees and perhaps in particular to 
its general manager. Next (The Dubious Offence), I examine the gap 
between expectations and demands from headquarters back home and the 
expectations and demands of the actors in the local environment outside 
the affiliates’ walls and how the managers communicate and deal with 
issues concerning diverging notions of corruption and ethical issues 
between these two realities. But before we continue to the tightrope-
walking managers, I’m going to give a brief introduction to how some of 
the differences between China and Norway are accounted for (Culture 
Quantified), and I will also introduce the concept ‘cultural broker’ and 
explain its relevance to this story about the Norwegian manager in China 
(The Expatriate Manager as Broker). 
 
Culture Quantified 
The differences between Norway and China are many, but nevertheless 
dependent on the perspective of the observer. A backpacker travelling in 
Sichuan will meet quite a different country than the one presented to a 
delegation of business people and officials coming to Beijing for a week 
of ‘walling and ducking’.1  
A quantitative study that illustrates differences between Norway and 
China (as well as other nations and their cultures) is the Corruption 
                                                 
1 A concept referring to the treatment of important guests in China – trips to the Great 
Wall and the Forbidden City and the mandatory Peking duck banquet. See 
McGregor’s book ‘One Billion Customers’ or ‘Mr. China’ by Tim Clissold for some 
entertaining stories about this and other aspects of the Chinese business reality. 
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Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International.2  The 
2007 index, including 180 countries, reflects business people’s and 
country analysts’ perception of corruption. The scores are given on a 
scale ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). In the index 
Norway scored 8.7, ranking as the global number nine regarding 
cleanness, while China, scoring 3.5 points, ranks as number 72, in other 
words, regarded as a quite corrupt country.  
Another well-known approach to quantifying cultures and their 
differences was conducted by Geert Hofstede (2001), who wrote the book 
Culture’s Consequences3 where national cultures are reviewed along five 
bi-polar dimensions based on a quantitative survey in which IMB 
employees from 70 different countries participated.  
 
Figure 1: China and Norway according to Hofstede 
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The Power distance index (PDI) measures the degree of equality (or 
inequality) regarding the distribution of power and opportunities. In 
China, the distance between nobody and somebody is quite high, while 
Norwegians apparently are more equally distributed (figure 1). In the 
second dimension, individualism (IDV), Norway has a high score, while 
                                                 
2 See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007 
3 The book was originally published in 1980 including four dimensions. The fifth 
dimension was added in the 1991 edition and applied to 23 countries. 
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China, according to Hofstede, is a collective society in which people are 
tied into strong, cohesive groups, often extended families, which continue 
protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. The third 
dimension, masculinity (MAS), measures gender differentiation. Norway 
is described as a gender-neutral society, while China is described as quite 
masculine. The fourth dimension, uncertainty avoidance index (UAI), is 
the only dimension in which Norway and China are on the same side of 
the world average.4 Both countries belong to the share of the world less 
concerned about ambiguity and uncertainty. The fifth dimension, 
included in the 1991 edition, allegedly based on Chinese and Confucian 
values, is termed long-term orientation (LTO). A high score in this 
dimension indicates having a sense of shame, relationships ordered by 
status, thrift and perseverance. A low score points to a culture in which 
respect for tradition, fulfilling social obligations and protecting one’s 
‘face’ are important elements. China touches the ceiling – which is quite 
surprising considering the central role of traditions, social obligations and 
the concept ‘face’ in Chinese culture. Norway scores low in this diligent 
dimension.  
At some level, a world in which national culture and their differences can 
be divided and understood as a handful of bi-polarities seems like 
comforting idea, but on the other hand, research claiming to have found 
the key to comprehending more or less the whole world should be met 
with skepticism. In the words of McSweeney (2002, 112), the on-going 
unquestioning acceptance of Hofstede’s national culture research by his 
evangelized entourage suggests that in part of the management disciplines, 
the criteria for acceptable evidence is too loose. McSweeney points to the 
fact that some of the national cultures reviewed are covered by thousands 
of questionnaires, while others are represented by less than one hundred 
respondents, that there is no valid reason to assume that IBM employees 
should reflect any national average; likewise, a ‘national average’ may 
also be highly unrepresentative, as a country could be populated by two 
or several opposing groups rather than one dominant culture. Furthermore, 
that designing and analyzing a questionnaire is a culturally-biased 
enterprise as such – how people understand and respond to survey 
questions may be more relevant than the answers they actually give. 
According to Eckhardt (2004), Chinese respondents tend to carefully 
consider what someone in their place in the hierarchy should think, rather 
than giving their own view on the matter in scope. The Confucian 
                                                 
4 The value obtained by dividing the sum of the countries’ scores by the number of 
countries in the survey.  
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dimension of Hofstede’s research has been especially met with confusion 
by many scholars, as this dimension is divided into two opposing poles 
based on what Hofstede and his entourage conceive as positive and 
negative Confucian values. Tony Fang (2003) asserts that values tagged 
as ‘short-term oriented’ or negative may not necessarily be so, and values 
tagged as ‘long-term oriented’ or positive may not necessarily be so, 
either. The values at each end of the LTO dimension are not contrasting or 
opposing, but rather closely interrelated with each other. Following Fang 
it may seem like Hofstede has failed to understand Chinese culture 
already in the process of preparing this survey, and both the design and 
results coming out of the fifth dimension are thus of a rather odd 
character and quite insignificant. 
Culture can be studied along several dimensions, aided by a variety of 
different methods, leading to a wide range of more or less correct, 
significant or useful results – if it is possible to talk about correctness 
when dealing with cultural understanding. Numbers and figures depicting 
cultural differences do provide some fun-facts and sometimes pieces of 
practical information, but to somehow discuss the more interesting and 
important issues regarding how culture works and evolves, and how to 
cope with challenges due to cultural differences, a more qualitative and 
perhaps local approach may prove productive. This chapter is by no 
means an attempt to write an account of Chinese culture; rather, it is 
merely an effort to illuminate some of the dilemmas faced by the 
multicultural company and their managers. ‘Balance’, as used in this 
chapter, does not refer to some invisible point on a bipolar scale of 
cultural dimensions. Culture assumes capability to reconcile opposite 
poles in a dynamic process of change and transformation (Fang, 2005), 
and the solutions that emerge when a Norwegian company set up in 
China are not necessarily something that may be summed up as 60 
percent Chinese and 40 percent Norwegian (or vice-versa). Some of the 
solutions that may be the result of an intersection of Chinese and 
Norwegian realities may very well be hybrid solutions with little or no 
resemblance to either side. ‘Balance’ hence refers to the need to take both 
perspectives into consideration when finding these solutions, not the 
solution as such.  
In addition to other researchers work on China, Chinese culture, business 
and work ethics, this chapter is based on my own fieldwork in China 
since 2001. In this period, when I’ve mainly been studying the seafood 
and the boat and shipbuilding industries, I have conducted numerous in-
depth interviews with Chinese and Norwegian personnel in Norwegian-
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owned companies operating in China, at the Norway-based headquarters, 
and also with the managers and owners of the local Chinese firms who 
meet the Norwegian companies in competition and cooperation (see 
Hansen, 2002; 2008a; 2008b). Most of these interviews have been 
conducted in small and medium sized enterprises. The interviews, often 
probing issues like the relationship between Chinese and foreign 
companies, their coping strategies and evaluations of each others, have 
also provided in-depth information about the roles and challenges of the 
expatriate managers in the Chinese market and production system.  
 
The expatriate manager as broker 
In order to illustrate and discuss the role of the manager in Norwegian-
owned affiliates in China, I’d like to make use of the concept ‘cultural 
broker’. Clifford Geertz (1960) used the concept in his study of the post-
revolutionary Indonesian society to describe the individuals who could 
translate the somewhat abstract ideologies of the “New Indonesia” into a 
language understood by the rural population, and in return, make clear to 
the intelligentsia the nature of the peasantry’s fears and aspirations. More 
recently, the concept has among other things been applied to describe the 
role of the teacher in cross-cultural education (Aikenhead, 1997) and 
movie directors in China’s booming filmmaking industry (Braester, 2005). 
In this context, I use ‘broker’ to refer to the manager working in foreign-
owned companies in China, as it in most cases is his or her responsibility 
to translate (i.e. understand and transmit) the reality in China to 
Norwegian headquarters, and back again. There are no solid statistics on 
exactly how many Norwegian companies are established in China, how 
many entities they are operating and the nationality of the manager or 
chief representative. According to Innovation Norway5 more than 120 
Norwegian-owned companies are established in China today, operating at 
least 150 partially or solely-owned ventures. Some of the Norwegian 
companies operate small sales and representation offices, while others 
have several establishments of various size and purpose in China. Judging 
from the names of the contact persons, it seems like 69 of these entities 
are headed by an ethnic Chinese representative or manager, 61 are run by 
                                                 
5 Innovation Norway is an organization that offers products and services intended to 
help boost innovation in business and industry nationwide, foster regional 
development and promote Norwegian industry and Norway as a tourist destination in 
international markets. 
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Norwegian or other expatriate managers,6 while 20 ventures are listed 
without identifying a contact person by name. Even though the broker in 
this context could be of any nationality and position, the brokers dealt 
with here are, unless otherwise mentioned, Norwegian managers working 
in China. 
 According to Tsang (2007), expatriates are usually expected to serve as 
agents of knowledge transfer, and to be responsible for transferring 
headquarters’ practices to overseas affiliates. In my understanding, 
however, the expatriate as a broker is not merely someone mediating or 
processing information from some patron to a set of clients, rather the 
role of the broker is, or at least should be, to handle information flowing 
both ways and make sure that the two realities understand each other. A 
manager with good brokering skills may be of immense importance to the 
international company’s success in China. Through the manager, the 
headquarters back home should get the information they need to make the 
decisions they are supposed to make, and further, the manager should be 
able to understand instructions and translate them into a language and 
actions appropriate to employees, customers, suppliers, government 
officials and even competitors in the host country. A strategy to fill the 
broker position in China has for many international companies been to 
hire an overseas Chinese expatriate manager (OCEM), i.e. ethnic Chinese 
who are permanent residents in other countries, as it seems obvious that 
the cultural distance to China will be less for them than in the case of 
Western managers (Selmer, 2002; Tsang, 2007). However, the solution 
might not be that simple. According to Selmer, the immediate cultural 
shock for a Western manager arriving in China may trigger some 
unlocking mechanism in which he or she acknowledges the cultural 
dissimilarities, becoming in turn motivated to learn and adjust to the new 
environment. To the OCEMs, on the other hand, the many cultural 
similarities may disguise the true differences and prevent learning and 
adjustment to take place. Western managers may also be given the benefit 
of the doubt whenever they behave improperly, and any step in the right 
direction (that is, towards cultural adjustment), may be seen as a welcome 
development, whereas OCEM’s lack of understanding of how to deal 
with local colleagues, subordinates and officials may be interpreted as 
evidence of incompetence (Selmer, 2002).  
 
                                                 
6 Employers assigned to work in a foreign country for a substantial period of time are 
often referred to as expatriates. 
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The Gap Within 
In Norway, engineers have drawings made by their kids on the office 
wall. 
Chinese engineer 
When a company decides to engage in new activity overseas, such as 
establishing a production plant or sales office in China, they are not only 
adding another input or output source to their value chain. They are also 
entering a system inhabited by a wide range of different local actors – 
such as political decision makers, competitors, suppliers, customers, 
employees etc. – who are navigating the reality guided by ethics, norms, 
standards, motivations, information and knowledge substantially different 
from those of the international actor entering this system. The challenge, 
for both sides and all affected parties, is then to extract and communicate 
some understanding from this mixture of values and guiding principles 
and behave as properly and reasonably as possible. In this section I will 
point to some of the challenges emerging when Norwegian and Chinese 
expectations and demands unite under the same roof. 
Being a manager of an international venture is very much about 
communication, and communication itself is very much about language; 
transferring knowledge to a foreign country requires clear, unambiguous 
communication between the sender and the recipient (Tsang, 2007). The 
vast majority of Norwegian business people in China speak little or no 
Chinese, whereas most Chinese people do not have a working command 
of English. According to a Norwegian expatriate manager: 
One of the problems I experience in China is sensing what is going on in 
the different levels of the company. Everything has to go through a 
translator, and sometimes working here feels like being a participant in a 
whispering game.  
Some of the Norwegian expatriates try to solve this by employing 
executives that do speak English, while others emphasize that employees 
who master both English and some relevant business or technical skills 
are so expensive and ambitious that it is hardly worth looking for them. A 
typical solution is then to employ an English-speaking secretary who 
becomes the ears and voice of the manager, or in other words, the 
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broker’s broker. But according to several Chinese executives in 
Norwegian-owned companies in China, this practice is problematic – the 
Norwegian boss gets most of his information about what is happening in 
the company through only one source; the English-speaking secretary, but 
she (it is usually a she) is often too young and inexperienced to 
understand the technology, people and potential controversies in the 
company. Apropos technology, the technical understanding of the general 
manager should, according to one of the Chinese executives, 
be equal to all employees, and he should have very good information 
about what happens in the company, as only then can he make good 
decisions.  
Being ‘equal to all employees’ also points to the importance of technical 
proficiency, which in China usually ranks high above management 
expertise (Tsang, 2007). The engineer was the ideal of the Communist 
elite (Bonnin, 2006), and if one looks at the background of the political 
and business elite in China, one will find that the majority are graduates 
from engineering schools. Expatriate managers, on the other hand, are 
often recruited on account of their management skills and international 
experience, rather than relevant technical skills, and may thus suffer from 
lack of authority and respect from employees as well as business partners 
and competitors in China. In interviews managers of Chinese-owned 
companies often emphasize that they know all about the technicalities of 
their products; that they are present in the production hall and participate 
actively in the construction, as well as design and development processes. 
One of the Chinese managers said mockingly about the manager of a 
Norwegian competitor,  
All the years we have been competing, he has only been working with 
customers, whereas I have been designing and constructing our products.  
Most expatriate managers of Norwegian-owned companies in China 
assert that they try to mix Western management ideas with the Chinese 
way of doing things. One effort emphasized by many of them is that they 
insist on treating equally well, regardless of position (see also 
Stenstadvold, 2005). As one of them said,  
Chinese bosses often regard employees who are not executives or high-
skilled engineers, as a necessary evil and treat them accordingly. I don't 
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accept that, and now as the staff is used to my style, it’ll probably be 
impossible to go back to a local general manager.  
A catchphrase in Chinese business literature is that the manager should be 
like a father to his subordinates (Kiong and Kee, 1998; Peng, Lu, Shenkar 
and Wang, 2001). The Norwegian managers know this and, as many of 
them probably are fathers in a conventional sense, they use this 
knowledge as a guiding line when dealing with employees. The catch is 
that the role of a good Norwegian father is different from the role of a 
good Chinese father. Authority figures in China, such as the general 
manager or the immediate supervisor, are seen as father substitutes, and 
they are given absolute loyalty and obedience by subordinates as sons 
(Hui, Lee and Rosseau, 2004). In a Norwegian setting the idea about the 
authoritarian father has a bad ring to it; a father is supposed to listen 
attentively and carefully consider the views of his children, and if the 
children can’t agree on something, the Norwegian father should help 
them to settle the matter between themselves. In China, on the other hand, 
a direct and authoritarian leadership style is expected and participative 
management is not valued (Peng et al., 2001). Information, responsibility 
and decisions are pushed to the top of the Chinese company hierarchy, 
and orders and directives drizzle down. A manager of a Chinese company 
competing directly with Norwegian producers confirms this, saying that,  
The Chinese and Norwegian ways are very different. Workers have more 
responsibility in Norway, while bosses have less.  
Adhering to what they find to be the best solution, Norwegian managers 
in China often try to make the different units of the organization talk to 
each other and take responsibility for processes and also solving matters 
at a lower level in the company hierarchy. The “social democratic” mode 
of organization is well received by Chinese workers in some regards, but 
it is also a source of conflict and confusion. This is illustrated by the 
Chinese executive of a Norwegian-owned company who pointed out the 
following:  
When we have meetings the general manager always asks us what we 
should do. I think the general manager should tell us what to do, not ask! 
This interferes with effectiveness, and it is the reason why our profits are 
lower than our (local) competitors!  
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Another local employee of a Norwegian company in China is more subtle 
and says,  
We used to be told what to do, but now we have personal responsibility. 
Responsibility is good for people, but perhaps not for productivity (…) 
the salary is linked to productivity…  
Productivity and profits are other keywords. When a Norwegian company 
establishes or acquires a factory in China, they often meet workers who 
are used to a system where a large proportion of the salary is closely 
connected to the company’s profit and productivity (Chiu, Luk and Tang, 
2002). The typical Norwegian reaction to this is that the Chinese 
incentive system looks like a mess, and the Norwegians make reforms in 
which the regular salaries increase and the bonuses are reduced. But this 
complex bonus system which grew out of the cracked “iron-rice bowl” 
during the eighties, is generally popular and regarded by many as an 
important motivation factor to perform well (ibid.). Another reason for 
decreasing the bonuses is to establish a more quality-minded attitude 
among the employees. According to a Norwegian engineer in China,  
They are used to work for quantity-related bonuses, and then the main 
point is to finish the job as fast as possible – and that may jeopardise the 
quality. But if we remove the bonus system they’ll probably just sit down 
and wait for the hours to pass by. It is a great challenge to establish an 
incentive system that not only stimulates efficiency, but also quality.  
To overcome some of the cultural distance, some companies provide pre-
assignment training programs to prepare managers and staff for postings 
in China (Selmer, 2000; Tsang, 2007). But it is not only the expatriate 
manager and the local staff that have to understand each other and find 
ways of making the business work. Several Norwegian managers in 
China also emphasize the importance of reporting to superiors in Norway 
with in-depth knowledge of the Chinese business environment as this 
provides them with better operational premises. Most expatriate managers 
stay in close connection with their headquarters, usually reporting home 
by phone on a regular basis, but some say that it is hard to satisfactorily 
explain the situation to colleagues with limited experience from China, to 
get relevant guidance and feedback from their superiors, and also that 
they sometimes feel like it sounds as they are just making up excuses 
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when they report about challenges and difficulties encountered as part of 
the daily operations of the branch plant or from the Chinese business 
environment as such. The same opinion is frequently asserted by Chinese 
representatives and managers of Norwegian companies in China, who 
often find it hard to transmit the Chinese reality in a way that is 
understood by their Norwegian employers. In the words of a Norwegian 
expatriate manager,  
It is not hard to understand why our company’s CEO, who visits the plant 
once or twice a year, thinks the situation is fantastic. But you have to stay 
here longer to understand what the situation really is like and what kind 
of challenges we are facing.  
This is underlined by Vance (2006) who asserts that; as persistent cultural 
differences influence the nature of detailed activities and procedures of 
company strategy implementation at the local country operation level, 
there should be sensitivity to the demands of the local context. In order to 
create some sensitivity to the demands of the local context, it is vital that 
the headquarters make some efforts to learn from and about the Chinese 
reality. One means is to exhaustively debrief their expatriate managers 
coming home, and if possible keep them and their experiences within the 
company. Another way of gaining knowledge of the Chinese context is 
through exchange programs between headquarters or facilities in Norway 
and the affiliate in China. Many of the Norwegian-owned companies in 
China are small and medium sized enterprises that operate few overseas 
branches. To a certain degree their move to China has been accompanied 
by reduction and restructuring of staff and tasks at the home base, and 
this has led to a slight suspicion and bad feelings directed towards the 
new colleagues in China. Exchange of staff both ways has been reported 
to be an efficient agent of organizational learning and mutual 
understanding. According to a Norwegian manager in China, the 
communication between the staff at the home base and the plant in China 
used to be a bit tense, but now as they have had some engineers from 
China in Norway and vice-versa, the situation has improved significantly. 
Commenting on this one manager asserted, 
Earlier, we just received a set of instructions from Norway, but now we 
feel more like real colleagues,  
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Exchanging key personnel between different plants may also encourage 
employees to take more responsibility and solve problems directly by 
contacting the relevant department at the other facility, rather than taking 
everything through the local plant manager. 
 
The Dubious Offence 
As this year's Mid-Autumn Festival approaches, the All-China 
Environment Federation (ACEF) on Wednesday launched a campaign to 
persuade the public to refuse moon cakes that are packaged too 
luxuriously. (…) In recent years moon cakes, a traditional symbol of 
family love, have been accused of wasting resources and even becoming 
a tool for corruption. 
Xinhua Online (September 13, 2006) 
Corruption – defined by Transparency International as the abuse of power 
for personal gain – isn’t always a brown envelope with cash cunningly 
handed over to someone with a sly little nod. Corruption is a concept met 
with confusion on the legislative arena, in media, academic work, and 
business practices. The Norwegian law regarding corruption (Criminal 
Law, Chapter 26) was sharpened in 2003, now increasingly 
encompassing affairs abroad, but, according to NHO (The Confederation 
of Norwegian Enterprises), there have so far been few verdicts, and 
interpretation of the new regulation is thus very much up to the each and 
everyone dealing with potentially sensitive matters. Cultural and 
legislative differences across national borders are other factors adding to 
this confusion. From my own personal experience, China is not one of 
those countries where you have to start flipping paper money in order to 
get a table in a crowded restaurant. Taxi drivers will, unless otherwise 
agreed upon, use the meter and drive from A to B without any extra 
sightseeing (at least in most cases). Moreover, as a passionate biker in 
Shanghai’s traffic, I’ve never met a police officer who tried to take 
advantage of my intersection impatience. 
On the other hand, in September 2006 the Shanghai party chief, Chen 
Liangyu and a number of other officials, were arrested for the 
misappropriation of 400 millions USD from the city’s social-security 
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fund (Economist, 2006; Hui, 2006), street vendors pay off local officials 
to avoid confiscations and piracy charges when dealing in counterfeit 
Luis Vuitton bags (Hansen and Møller, forthcoming 2009), and both 
international and local companies in China report that they from time to 
time receive and also are requested to give inappropriate gifts to officials 
and supply managers of other firms in exchange for favorable decisions 
(Brand and Slater, 2003; Millington, Eberhardt and Wilkinson, 2005; 
Stenstadvoll, 2005). Doh et al. (2003) assert that the corruption in China 
is quite pervasive, but not arbitrary. In other words, the level of 
corruption is high, but on the “bright” side, bribes work – contrary to 
other countries where baksheesh are requested from all direction with no 
guarantee of results. The Chinese Government’s official web portal 
reports that it was quite common for international companies bidding for 
business in China to offer potential customers or partners kickbacks 
ranging from cash and luxury goods to paid holidays. Many companies 
believed that the practice was a “tacit rule” of the Chinese market until a 
Los Angeles company was fined in the United States for paying bribes in 
China (Chen, 2005). Most Norwegian managers I have met in China 
assert that they have no tolerance towards bribes and kickbacks, and 
many of them arrange meetings with suppliers to inform them that they 
will be cut off or reported if they wave a carrot in front of any company 
executives. But fancy statements are one thing; reality is something else. 
One of the managers told me that he had a special compartment in his 
safe where he stores the bribes his loyal executives couldn't avoid 
receiving;  
I don't know what to do with this money, it just piles up,  
he said. Another Norwegian manager asserts that he definitely does not 
approve of bribery, but if it does occur within his firm, he doesn't want to 
know about it. 
The activities mentioned above are more or less obvious cases of 
corruption. However, as mentioned earlier; business is not only about 
input and output. In China, probably even more than most places, mutual 
trust and relations are important to performing in an economic 
environment which is perhaps a bit more flexible than the more square-
headed Scandinavian environment. To give a mundane illustration of this, 
I’d like to exploit a Norwegian friend of mine who once complained to a 
Chinese friend about some troubles he had regarding the departure date of 
his apparently unalterable Finnair ticket, and his Chinese friend 
immediately and slightly surprised replied, “But don't you have any 
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friends in the airline company?” According to a Chinese chief 
representative for a Norwegian company in Shanghai,  
The Chinese business environment is, partly because of weaker 
legislative regulation, more flexible than Western business environments.  
Maneuvering oneself and stretching the environment in the right direction 
with personal skills and relationships are vital. See, for instance, the 
monumental body of research and debates on the concept and phenomena 
“guanxi”, a concept referring to a system of personal ties that carry long-
term social obligations that are assumed to play a vital role in Chinese 
business (Millington et al., 2005). In these personal ties, gifts, favors, 
information and new relationships are distributed. By cultivating guanxi 
with bureaucrats, suppliers and customers, companies in China may 
protect themselves against some of the uncertainties in an economy still 
lacking some of the safeguards of a true market economy (Luo, 1997). 
Guanxi can be both positive and negative; sometimes it works as a moral 
system supervising the good conduct of its members, other times as a 
vehicle for corruption (Li, 2007). Keeping the balance right between 
appropriate and adequate business relations and the opposite is a great 
challenge to expatriates, as well as many Chinese. According to several 
local sales managers and agents in the Chinese maritime industry,  
It is not the quality and prize that matter; it’s the relationship between 
buyer and seller that’s important.7  
The best sales arguments are not necessarily part of the product itself. 
What may be the winning argument to close a business deal could very 
well be something external to the actual transaction, and then it gets more 
intricate, potentially unethical and perhaps even illegal as context, 
cultural complexity and laws have to be interpreted and considered. In 
China, relationships with customers, suppliers and local officials are often 
established and maintained during long, and sometimes extravagant, 
dinners, in karaoke lounges, or, as indicated above, by treating your 
contacts with the traditional moon cake or other tokens of friendship. 
Intuitively, friendship, fine dinners, karaoke and moon cakes are ok, but 
how much is it too much? Is it when the restaurant bill reaches a certain 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that this point of view, which is most often flagged by sales 
people, probably also is made to underline the importance of their own role and 
relations, and thus their irreplaceableness.  
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amount, is it when the champagne bottles in the karaoke lounge arrive on 
velvet pillows, or is it when the moon cake is wrapped in a Buick? 
Judgments of what is “excessive” and “appropriate” are finely tuned to 
local culture and circumstance (Granovetter, 2007), and keeping the 
balance on the fine line between karaoke and corruption is an endeavor 
expatriate managers should take seriously not only to sleep well at night 
but also to perform well in the host economy. According to Luo (1997), 
many Western business people fail to see the difference between guanxi, 
which is about strengthening personal relationships that may or may not 
be called upon in the future, and corruption, in which investments in a 
relationship is a targeted ‘fee-for-service’. Furthermore, Luo asserts that 
many Western business people often are in danger of overemphasizing 
the gift-giving and wining-and-dining components of a guanxi 
relationship, thereby coming dangerously close to crass bribery or to be 
perceived as ‘meat and wine friends’ which is a Chinese metaphor for 
mistrust (ibid., 47).  
In order to cope with the ethical issues in China, Brand and Slater (2003) 
found that Australian managers often choose a mixture of four adaptive 
strategies. The most common strategy underlined by the Australian 
managers is about not compromising one’s own morals; referring to an 
attitude where the managers are – or at least say they are – prepared to 
walk out of an ethical problematic situation regardless of the potential 
loss of profits. The second most frequently mentioned strategy is to try to 
understand the motivation of the Chinese people, or in other words, just 
accept that things are done differently in China. The third strategy is to 
talk to other expatriate managers in China and use their experiences to 
create a common ethical understanding of appropriateness. The fourth 
strategy is called adherence to company policy; by providing clear 
guidelines to officers operating in foreign locations, firms may reduce the 
stresses experienced by managers caught between two operating cultures 
(see also Doh et al. (2003) for some coping strategies regarding 
corruption).  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I’ve established that China and Norway in many respects 
represent different realities, and further that, in the case of the 
international venture in China, a manager with good brokering skills may 
Karaoke or Corruption 
 131
be a good bridge between these realities. I do not think the key to success 
for international ventures in China is to adapt and dovetail perfectly into 
the structures, culture and practices of the Chinese business environment. 
Nor is it to avoid adaptation and apply universal arguments and practices 
to resist challenges encountered in China. In order to cope with the 
challenges emerging out of differences, the first step should be to identify 
expectations and demands from both realities regarding operational issues 
such as HRM, quality management and incentive systems as well as 
issues related to the company’s interaction with actors in the local 
business environment, such as corruption and other ethical matters. 
Neither side should be considered predefined as ambiguousness exists 
and flexibility is needed on both sides. For the person in charge of the 
international company’s Chinese branch, it is important to identify 
expectations and demands from both sides. However, in order to make 
the Norwegian and Chinese realities accept each other, it is crucial to 
create and facilitate a mutual ongoing dialogue and dynamic 
understanding of practices and ethics that not only rest with the manager 
in charge of the foreign owned affiliate but also extend to headquarters as 
well as the local employees, suppliers and customers. The next step 
should thus be to make the two realities communicate and get to know 
each other. Practical strategies to achieve this dialogue may be to 
integrate the affiliate better into the organization by exchanging 
employees between the affiliate and the headquarters, or to arrange 
meetings with suppliers and customers to explain the company’s stand on 
certain ethical issues. It may very well be a good idea to establish some 
resilient rules regarding ethics and practices and draw the line between 
karaoke and corruption once and for all, but the performance, practices 
and ethics of a Norwegian affiliate in China neither can nor should be 
identical to the performance, practices and ethics of the head office back 
home (or the next-door Chinese company for that matter). What should 
be strived for is to achieve performance, implement practices and develop 
ethical standards that can be understood, accepted and appreciated in both 
realities.  
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